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I ART C E
TIME FOR AN UPGRADE: AMENDING
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGES OF
ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION
IN CIVIL LITIGATION
Jonathan L. Moore*
ABSTRACT: In recent years, electronically stored information (ESI) has begun to
play an increasingly important role in civil litigation. Although the e-discovery
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 2006 provided guidelines for
the discovery of this information, no accompanying changes were made to the Federal
Rules of Evidence to govern the admissibility of this information at trial.
This article outlines the vastly different ways courts have addressed this problem
in three areas: authentication, hearsay, and the best evidence rule. After discussing the
various approaches courts take in these areas, this article proposes specific amendments
to the Federal Rules of Evidence that would provide guidance to courts and litigants as
to the admissibility of electronically stored information at trial.
CITATION: Jonathan L. Moore, Time for an Upgrade: Amending the Federal Rules
of Evidence to Address the Challenges of Electronically Stored Information in Civil
Litigation, 50 Jurimetrics J. 147-193 (2010).
America has undergone a radical transformation with the rise of computer
technology, firmly placing modem society into the "Digital Age."' As a result,
there has been a dramatic increase in the amount of digital information created
each day.2 This information can be stored in "mainframe computers, network
servers, personal computers, hand-held devices, automobiles, [and even]
*Associate, Bowman and Brooke LLP, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2009, University of
Richmond School of Law, summa cum laude. The author would like to thank Professor James
Gibson for his helpful comments and suggestions on this article.
1. MICHAEL R. ARKFELD, ARKFELD ON ELEcTRONIc DISCOVERY AND EVIDENCE § 1.1 (2d
ed. 2009) (summarizing the rise of the "Digital Age").
2. See, e.g., 2 GEORGE E. DLx ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 227, at 72 (Kenneth S.
Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) (noting that "the recording, communication, and preservation of digital
information pervade society"); see also infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
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household appliances."3 The changes brought by this technology pervade all
aspects of modem life, "chang[ing] almost everything about our relationship
with information: how we create it, how much of it we create, how it is stored,
who sees it, [and] how and when we dispose of it."
4
In light of its proliferation, it should come as no surprise that digital infor-
mation has begun to play a greater role in litigation.5 Indeed, the value of elec-
tronic information has been demonstrated historically in such famous instances
as President Clinton's relationship with Monica Lewinsky,6 the Iran-Contra
scandal,7 and the Rodney King beatings.8 Yet, throughout these vast techno-
logical and societal changes, the Federal Rules of Evidence have essentially
remained static. 9 Accordingly, when faced with new forms of electronic evi-
dence, federal courts have used vastly differing admissibility standards. This
article's thesis is that the varying standards for admitting electronically stored
information necessitate amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence to pro-
vide clarity and uniformity. 10
3. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446, at 78 (2004), available at http://
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsfllookup/mcl4.pdf/$file/mcl4.pdf [hereinafter MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION].
4. James Gibson, A Topic Both Timely and Timeless, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 49, 2 (2004),
available at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v1 0i5/article49.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 462 (D. Utah 1985) ("Improvements
in technology which advantage almost everyone have become commonplace and widespread, and
because we live in a society which emphasizes both computer technology and litigation, the mix
of computers and lawsuits is ever increasing."); 8B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2218 (Supp. 2007) (noting that "it has become evident that com-
puters are central to modem life and consequently also to much civil litigation").
6. See Marianne Lavelle & Elise Ackerman, Perjury and the President, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Oct. 5, 1998, at 22 (discussing how independent counsel Kenneth Starr used e-mails
to bolster his findings and Monica Lewinsky's credibility). These e-mails were frequently cited in
Starr's final report. See generally KENNETH W. STARR, U.S. OFFICE OF THE INDEP. COUNSEL, THE
REPORT (1998), available at http://elections.donyell.net/other-reports/ken-starr.pdf.
7. See Martha Middleton, A Discovery: There May Be Gold in E-Mail, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 20,
1993, at 1, 40 (noting that Oliver North was "convicted in part because information was discov-
ered on mainframe backup tapes that had been deleted from an electronic-mail system").
8. See M.A. Stapleton, Discovery 'Paper Chase' Transforming Bit By Byte As Attorneys
Target Computer Data, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 25, 1994, at 20 (noting the e-mail messages of
an officer involved in the Rodney King beating, sent shortly after the incident, which stated
"[o]ops, I haven't beaten anyone so bad in a long time").
9. E.g., PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 492 (2d ed. 2008)
(noting that "new evidentiary problems faced in the Internet Age have been directly addressed in
few, if any, of these evidence codes"); George L. Paul, The "Authenticity Crisis" in Real
Evidence, LAW PRAC. TODAY, Mar. 2006, http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/tch03065.shtm
("Certainly no action has been taken by Congress to change the Federal Rules of Evidence to
address the recent wave of digitization."). One notable exception is the recent passage of Federal
Rule of Evidence 502, which was designed, in part, to address issues surrounding inadvertent
waiver of the attomey-client privilege when producing electronically stored information. See infra
notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
10. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to both civil and criminal cases, see FED.
R. EvtD. 1101(b), this article will focus on ESI's role in civil litigation. Differences in the criminal
context will be noted when relevant.
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Part I describes what electronically stored information (ESI) is and some
of the factors that led to its increasingly significant role in litigation. Part II
outlines the various standards courts have adopted in response to the prolifera-
tion of this type of evidence, specifically in the areas of authentication, hear-
say, and the best evidence rule. Finally, Part III proposes specific amendments
to the Federal Rules of Evidence that would provide needed guidance to courts
when determining the admissibility of electronically stored information.
I. BACKGROUND:
THE GROWING ROLE OF
ESI IN LITIGATION
A. What is ESI?
The term "electronically stored information" is broad and difficult to
define." Some commentators have resigned themselves to this fact and de-
fined the term simply as "everything other than the traditional paper docu-
ments or microfilm."' 12 Others provide a slightly narrower definition of "any
information created, stored, or best utilized with computer technology of any
type."' 13 When the Advisory Committee amended the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 2006,14 it noted that "[t]he wide variety of computer systems
currently in use, and the rapidity of technological change, counsel against a
limiting or precise definition."' 15 While these technological changes may make
a precise definition impossible, in litigation, ESI typically comes in several
11. Interestingly, one pocket guide for judges simply defines the term "ESI" as
"[e]lectronically stored information," without attempting a further definition. BARBARA J.
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION:
A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 23 (2007), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
eldscpkt.pdf/$file/eldscpkt.pdf.
12. MARIAN K. RIEDY ET AL., LITIGATING WITH ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION 5
(2007). Similarly, the Sedona Conference, a widely respected group of scholars, defines ESI as
"[ellectronically stored information, regardless of the media or whether it is in the original format
in which it was created, as opposed to stored in hard copy (i.e. on paper)" in its Glossary. SEDONA
CONF. WORKING GROUP, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY & DIGITAL
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 20 (2d ed. 2007), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/
content/miscFileslTSCGlossary_12 07.pdf [hereinafter SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY; see
also Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 217 F.R.D. 309, 318-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (outlining five
categories of electronic information).
13. CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTICES, GUIDELINES FOR STATE TRIAL COURTS REGARDING
DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY-STORED INFORMATION 1 (2006), available at http://www.ncsc
online.org/images/EDiscCCJGuidelinesFinal.pdf.
14. See infra Part 1.B.
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee's note.
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common "evidentiary 'flavors,""' 6 such as e-mail,' 7 Web sites and Internet
postings,18 and computer-generated documents and data files.19
These various forms of ESI have several fundamental differences from
traditional forms of information that make them valuable for purposes of liti-
gation. Initially, the sheer volume of ESI is substantially greater than with
paper information. 20 In 2006 alone, the amount of digital information that was
created, captured, or replicated was over 161 billion gigabytes or "[three]
million times the information in all the books ever written. ' '2' Considering that
one gigabyte of data is, according to conservative estimates, the equivalent of
roughly 75,000 typed pages, 22 this amount of data would be the equivalent of
over twelve quadrillion pages of information. If printed, it would be enough
paper to fill the 110-story Sears Tower in Chicago (now known as the Willis
16. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D. Md. 2007); see also 2 Dix ET
AL., supra note 2, § 227, at 72 (noting that e-mails, Internet postings, and computer-generated
documents and data files are the most commonly used forms of "e-evidence").
17. "E-mail" means "[ain electronic means for communicating information under specified
conditions, generally in the form of text messages, through systems that will send, store, process,
and receive information and in which messages are held in storage until the addressee accesses
them." SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY, supra note 12, at 18; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 851 (1997) ("E-mail enables an individual to send an electronic message-generally akin to a
note or letter-to another individual or to a group of addressees. The message is generally stored
electronically, sometimes waiting for the recipient to check her 'mailbox' and sometimes making
its receipt known through some type of prompt.").
18. The "Internet" has been defined as "[a] worldwide network of networks that all use the
TCP/IP communications protocol and share a common address space. It supports services such as
e-mail, the World Wide Web, file transfer (FTP), and Internet Relay Chat (IRC). Also known as
'the net,' 'the information superhighway,' and 'cyberspace."' SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY,
supra note 12, at 28; see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 852 ("In concrete terms, the Web consists of a
vast number of documents stored in different computers all over the world. Some of these docu-
ments are simply files containing information. However, more elaborate documents, commonly
known as Web 'pages,' are also prevalent. Each has its own address-'rather like a telephone
number.' Web pages frequently contain information and sometimes allow the viewer to communi-
cate with the page's (or 'site's') author. They generally also contain 'links' to other documents
created by that site's author or to other (generally) related sites." (citation omitted)).
19. "Data" is "[a]ny information stored on a computer." SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY,
supra note 12, at 12. A "file" is "[a] collection of data or information stored under a specified
name on a disc." Id. at 21. Finally, a "document" is "[a] collection of pages or files produced
manually or by a software application, constituting a logical single communication of information,
but consisting of more than a single stand-alone record." Id. at 16.
20. See, e.g., ARKFELD, supra note 1, § 1.2(G).
21. JOHN F. GANTZ ET AL., INT'L DATA CORP., THE EXPANDING DIGITAL UNIVERSE: A
FORECAST OF WORLDWIDE INFORMATION GROWTH THROUGH 2010, at 1 (2007), available at http:
//www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/expanding-digital-idc-white-paper.pdf (emphasis added).
22. RALPH C. LOSEY, E-DISCOVERY: CURRENT TRENDS AND CASES app. at 291 (2008).
Notably, however, "[e]stimating 'pages' per gigabyte is more an art than a science," since "[t]he
number of pages per gigabyte will vary significantly based on the types of files at issue." Gil
Keteltas & John Rosenthal, Discovery of Electronic Evidence, in RICE, supra note 9, at 5 n.7. For
example, one source lists a gigabyte as the equivalent of 500,000 pages, see MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 3, § 11.446, while another listed a gigabyte as only 250,000
pages, United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31, 46 (D. Conn. 2002) ("The
hard drive actually contained approximately 1 GB, or 250,000 pages of data .... "). If the larger
estimate of 500,000 pages per gigabyte is used, the equivalent number of pages for all information
in 2006 would be 80.5 quadrillion.
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Tower) 644 million times. 23 Further, ninety-two percent of this electronic
information is stored on magnetic media and never reduced to paper form.
24
This vastly expanded pool of evidentiary sources is valuable for purposes of
litigation, particularly in light of its potentially informal nature.2
5
In addition to this flood of information, there is a significant amount of
26
redundancy, as data may be located in multiple places in multiple forms. For
example, a user may originally save a document on a computer and then
backup that document to an external source or e-mail a copy to another user.
27
In addition to intentional copying, a computer automatically creates "repli-
cant" data, also known as "archival" data, without any action by the user to
backup files in case there is a computer malfunction or power loss. 2' This
automatic backup procedure may result in multiple copies of an electronic file
29that a user cannot erase and often is not even aware exists.
Similarly, the existence of multiple copies of information makes perma-
nently deleting any electronic file difficult.30 Even if a user has not made any
copies intentionally, a computer will retain residual data relating to the file,
which is recoverable even if an attempt is made to delete it.31 Further, when a
user "deletes" a file, the computer simply makes the space occupied by that
file available for subsequent use. 32 Therefore, unless the computer overwrites
23. One terabyte of data is the equivalent of one thousand gigabytes, see GANTZ ET AL.,
supra note 21, at 2, so converting the 161 billion gigabytes of information in 2006 to terabytes
equals 161 million terabytes. A single terabyte of information, if printed, would fill the Sears
Tower four times. Jason Krause, What a Concept!: New Computer Search Methods Promise
Better E.Discovery Results, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2003, at 60, 60. Thus, multiplying 161 million tera-
bytes by four provides the fact that, if printed, the amount of information in 2006 would fill the
Sears Tower 644 million times.
24. See PETER LYMAN & HAL R. VARIAN, How MUCH INFORMATION? 1 (2003),
http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003/printable-report.pdf. This
number appears to remain relatively constant over time. See In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec.
Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437, 440 n.2 (D.N.J. 2002) (quoting a study finding that 93% of information
was generated in digital form).
25. See, e.g., ARKFELD, supra note 1, § 1.2(A). For an example of a case where the informal
nature of e-mails hurt the defendant, see Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., No. 91 Civ. 5928 (SWK),
1995 WL 326492, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1995) (sexual discrimination suit based, in part, upon
inappropriate e-mails sent by supervisor).
26. See ARKFELD, supra note 1, § 1.2(H).
27. See Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil
Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 336-37 (2000); see also Mark D.
Robins, Evidence at the Electronic Frontier: Introducing E-mail at Trial in Commercial
Litigation, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 219, 224 (2003).
28. See, e.g., ARKFELD, supra note 1, § 3.6(B); Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 27, at 336-
37.
29. See, e.g., ARKFELD, supra note 1, § 3.6(B); Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 27, at 336-
37.
30. See, e.g., Christine Sgarlata Chung & David J. Byer, The Electronic Paper Trail:
Evidentiary Obstacles to Discovery and Admission of Electronic Evidence, 4 B.U. J. SCt. & TECH.
L. 5, 12-18 (1998).
31. See ARKFELD, supra note 1, § 3.6(B); see also Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 27, at
337.
32. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 27, at 337.
WINTER 2010
Moore
the "deleted" file, generally, it can be recovered.33 Thus, electronic evidence
can still be found even if a party attempts to destroy it.
34
Electronically stored information is also much easier to manipulate than
traditional forms of evidence. 35 As technology permeates society, more people
have the ability to easily alter ESI-and at an increasingly lower cost. 36 As one
commentator noted, manipulation is far easier, in part, because "[e]diting
software exists for almost all types of digital information, whether it be busi-
ness records (word processing), photographs (image editing software), or
sound (digital audio workstations)., 37 E-mail is also susceptible to manipula-
tion. In one recent case, for example, the court rejected an e-mail offered by a
party because the time stamp indicated that it was sent seven months in the
future.
38
Metadata, or "data about data,",39 is another aspect of ESI that is not pre-
sent with printed information. 40 With printed copies, all of the relevant infor-
mation is clearly visible.' In contrast, with ESI, metadata can be embedded
within a file, providing information about that file, "such as the date it was
created, its author, when and by whom it was edited, what edits were made,
,42and, in the case of e-mail, the history of its transmission." A computer can
create this metadata automatically, or a user can provide it.43 This information
is generally not visible when a document is printed or converted to a different
format.44 Thus, metadata is important because it means that producing a print-
out of an electronically stored document in discovery does not necessarily
convey all of the information that may be available about that document.45
33. See id.; see also RICE, supra note 9, at xix (noting that electronic evidence is often "hard
to kill").
34. See, e.g., ARKFELD, supra note 1, § 3.6(B); Chung & Byer, supra note 30, 1 12.
35. See, e.g., ARKFELD, supra note 1, § 3.1(D); RICE, supra note 9, at 303-05; Chung &
Byer, supra note 30, 22-25; Paul, supra note 9.
36. See, e.g., Paul, supra note 9.
37. Id.
38. See Network Alliance Group L.L.C. v. Cable & Wireless USA, Inc., No. CIV 02-
644DWFAJB, 2002 WL 1205734, at *1 & n.2 (D. Minn. May 31, 2002) (acknowledging "incon-
sistencies within the alleged e-mail correspondence which suggest that the correspondence is not
authentic. Most notably, the 'date stamp' for one of the e-mail messages is Thursday, December 6,
2002. Obviously, December 6, 2002, has not yet arrived. Moreover, December 6, 2001, was a
Thursday, but December 6, 2002, will be a Friday.").
39. Madison River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt. Software Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 521, 528 n.5
(M.D.N.C. 2005); see also SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY, supra note 12, at 33 (defining
metadata, in part, as "[d]ata typically stored electronically that describes characteristics of ESI,
found in different places in different forms"). See generally W. Lawrence Wescott H, The
Increasing Importance of Metadata in Electronic Discovery, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10 (2008)
(discussing the various types of metadata and how they are used in litigation).
40. See, e.g., ARKFELD, supra note 1, § 3.7(A).
41. See id.
42. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 3.
43. See RICE, supra note 9, at 235; see also SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY, supra note
12, at 33 (noting that metadata "[clan be supplied by applications, users or the file system").
44. See RICE, supra note 9, at 234.
45. See, e.g., ARKFELD, supra note 1, §§ 1.4(C), 3.7(A).
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However, metadata, like all ESI, is prone to manipulation, potentially
making it an inaccurate or misleading source of information.46 This alteration
can occur intentionally or inadvertently.47 For example, metadata can reflect
that an electronic document was modified, when in fact it was only accessed or
saved to a different location. 48 These various unique characteristics of ESI,
such as metadata, demonstrate the significant differences between ESI and
traditional printed copies of information.
B. The E-Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure
Before 2006, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had not been amended
to reflect the issues presented by computers since 1970. 49 Although judges and
practitioners realized that "digital is different," the common view was that the
existing rules could accommodate this form of evidence. 50 However, because
of the problems that began to arise in connection with the growth of technol-
ogy, the Rules were amended in 2006 to provide additional guidance for the
discovery of electronically stored information.
5 1
Although a complete discussion of these changes is beyond the scope of
this article, the effect of these amendments was to regulate and expand the role
of ESI in litigation.52 Generally, these amendments resulted in the "discovery
of electronically stored information stand[ing] on equal footing with [the]
discovery of paper documents." 53 Recognizing the variety of computer sys-
tems in existence and the pace at which technology was changing, the Rules
adopted an expansive definition of ESI to include "any type of information
that is stored electronically. 54
46. See RICE, supra note 9, at 234-35.
47. See SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY, supra note 12, at 33.
48. E.g., Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 530-31 (1st Cir. 1996); see Sedona
Conference Working Group, The Sedona Conference Commentary on ESI Evidence &
Admissibility, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 217, 227, 229 (2008) (noting some of the methods that can be
used to manipulate metadata).
49. E.g., Lee H. Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on Electronic Discovery After December 1,
2006, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167, 167 (2006) ("The last time the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were amended to acknowledge computers was 1970, when the words 'data and data
compilations' were added to Rule 34.").
50. Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 172 (2006), http://
www.law.northwestem.edu/joumals/njtip/v4/n2/3/J.%20Withers.pdf.
51. Id. at 191-94.
52. For a complete discussion of the e-discovery amendments, see generally Rosenthal,
supra note 49 and Withers, supra note 50. For a discussion of the initial case law interpreting
these amendments, see generally Emily Bums et al., E-Discovery: One Year of the Amended
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 201 (2008).
53. FED. R. Clv. P. 34 advisory committee's note.
54. Id. The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 34 go on to state that "[r]eferences elsewhere
in the rules to 'electronically stored information' should be understood to invoke this expansive
approach." Id.
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More specifically, several amendments require parties to pay attention to
the discovery of ESI early in litigation. An amendment to Rule 26(f) requires
parties to discuss and develop a proposed plan for "any issues relating to dis-
closure or discovery of electronically stored information, including the form or
forms in which it should be produced. 5 Similarly, an amendment to Rule 16
allows a court's scheduling order to address ESI.
56
Amendments also address the production of ESI. First, changes to Rule
26(a)(1)(B) require parties to provide a copy or description of all electronically
stored information that was in their control, along with any documents or
physical evidence, that may be used to support claims or defenses. 57 Another
amendment limits the scope of discovery required when ESI was "not rea-
sonably accessible because of undue burden or cost."58 This provision recog-
nizes the various issues that may arise when attempting to locate or retrieve
ESI, such as remnants of deleted files that may require substantial effort to
recover.
59
If the parties are unable to reach an agreement in the Rule 26(f) confer-
ence, an amendment to Rule 34(b) "provide[s] a default procedure for the
production of electronically stored information." 60 Recognizing that ESI may
exist in several forms, the rule allows a discovery request to "specify the form
or forms in which electronically stored information is to be produced."6'
If a requesting party does not specify a particular form of ESI, the re-
sponding party has two options. First, the party can produce the information in
"a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained. 62 Alternatively, a party
can produce the information in a "reasonably usable form." 63 Regardless, "a
party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more than
one form. '64
55. FED. R. Cfv. P. 26(f). As noted by the Advisory Committee, "[t]he particular issues
regarding electronically stored information that deserve attention during the discovery planning
stage depend on the specifics of the given case." Id. advisory committee's note. This amendment
was important in light of the complicated preservation obligations created by the volume and
dynamic nature of ESI. Id. Because computers may both automatically create and delete or over-
write files during the course of ordinary operation, the Advisory Committee was concerned that
failure to address these issues early in litigation would result in uncertainty and increase the po-
tential for disputes. Id.
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii). The Advisory Committee's notes stated that "[tihe
amendment ... is designed to alert the court to the possible need to address the handling of dis-
covery of electronically stored information early in the litigation." Id. advisory committee's note.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(B).
58. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
59. See Rosenthal, supra note 49, at 168-69.
60. Withers, supra note 50, at 203.
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b). Of course, the responding party retains the ability to object to the
form of ESI production sought. See id.
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii). Many commentators have interpreted this provision to
mean that ESI can be produced in its "native file format." E.g., Withers, supra note 50, at 203.
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii). This option may require a party to "'translate' informa-
tion it produces into a 'reasonably usable' form." Id. advisory committee's note.
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(iii).
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Several additional amendments address miscellaneous issues presented by
allowing the discovery of ESI. For example, a change to Rule 26(b)(5) ad-
dresses the potential for waiver of the attorney-client privilege by producing
ESI.65 Another provision protects a party from sanctions for the failure to
provide ESI lost "as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an elec-
tronic information system.",66 Further, a Rule 33 amendment allows interroga-
tories to be answered by producing electronically stored business records.
67
Overall, these "e-discovery" amendments created provisions "designed to
integrate electronic evidence and materials into every stage of the litigation
process.
68
II. CURRENT ATTEMPTS TO APPLY
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE TO ESI
Despite ensuring the discoverability of ESI, to date, no changes have been
made to clarify how and when this newly discoverable evidence will be admis-
sible at trial. 6 9 Accordingly, judges have been forced to resolve the evidentiary
issues presented by ESI through a growing body of diverse, and often diamet-
rically opposed, opinions. 70 This section examines how courts have applied the
Federal Rules of Evidence to ESI, specifically in the areas of authentication,
hearsay, and the best evidence rule.
A. Authentication
1. General Authentication Rules
In order for evidence to be admissible, it must be authenticated. 71 Federal
Rule of Evidence 901 provides that the authentication requirement is "a con-
dition precedent to admissibility," which is "satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. ' 72
65. FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note; see Withers, supra note 50, at 201-02.
66. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(f).
67. FED. R. CIv. P. 33(d).
68. Timothy J. Chorvat, E-Discovery and Electronic Evidence in the Courtroom: A Primer
for Business Lawyers, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 2007, http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2007-
09-10/chorvat.shtml; see also PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-
657 (DNH/RFT), 2007 WL 2687670, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) ("With the rapid and sweep-
ing advent of electronic discovery, the litigation landscape has been radically altered in terms of
scope, mechanism, cost, and perplexity.").
69. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
70. See RICE, supra note 9, at 492. Generally, courts make preliminary rulings on the admis-
sibility of evidence. See FED. R. EVtD. 104.
71. FED. R. EvD. 901.
72. FED. R. EvtD. 901(a).
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Essentially, this requirement is a "special aspect of relevancy"-if evidence is
not authentic, it has no relevance to the case.V
3
Pursuant to Rule 104(b), a judge must be satisfied that there is sufficient
evidence to support a finding by the trier of fact that the evidence at issue is
what its proponent claims.74 Typically, this standard is "not a particularly high
barrier to overcome. ' 75 Thus, for example, to authenticate a photograph, a
witness may testify that it accurately represents the depicted scene, regardless
of whether that witness took the photograph or was present when it was
taken.76
Rule 901 provides a non-exhaustive list of illustrations of how the authen-
tication requirement can be satisfied.77 For example, testimony from a witness
with knowledge that "a matter is what it is claimed to be" will suffice. 78 Any
distinctive characteristics of the evidence can also be used for authentication
purposes.79 Although this provision contains several subsections targeted at
specific types of evidence, such as telephone conversations, there is currently
no provision specifically addressing electronically stored information.8" Rule
902 also provides various methods that allow a piece of evidence to be self-
authenticating.8'
Notably, even if evidence is authentic, it "by no means assures admission
of an item into evidence, as other bars, hearsay for example, may remain. 82
However, as one court noted, "the inability to get evidence admitted because
of a failure to authenticate it almost always is a self-inflicted injury which can
be avoided by thoughtful advance preparation."
83
73. FED. R. EvID. 901 advisory committee's note; see also 31 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 7102 (2000) ("Thus, Rule 901 does
not have to create the authentication requirement because it is implicit in Rule 402, which makes
inadmissible evidence that is irrelevant."). For example, in a prosecution for drug possession, if
the prosecution attempted to introduce a bag of drugs, that evidence would not be relevant unless
it could be proven that the specific bag of drugs that was being introduced was the same bag that
had been found on the defendant. See 31 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra, § 7102.
74. FED. R. EVD. 104(b); see also infra note 347.
75. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 542 (D. Md. 2007).
76. E.g., United States v. Lawson, 494 F.3d 1046, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("A photograph
may be authenticated if a witness with knowledge of the scene testifies that it accurately depicts
the scene it purports to represent."); United States v. Clayton, 643 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. Unit
B Apr. 1981) ("A witness qualifying a photograph need not be the photographer or see the picture
taken; it is sufficient if he recognizes and identifies the object depicted and testifies that the photo-
graph fairly and correctly represents it.").
77. See FED. R. EvID. 901(b); see also id. advisory committee's note ("The examples are not
intended as an exclusive enumeration of allowable methods but are meant to guide and suggest,
leaving room for growth and development in this area of the law.").
78. FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(1).
79. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).
80. FED. R. EvID. 901 (b); see 2 Dix ET AL., supra note 2, § 227, at 72.
81. See FED. R. EVD. 902.
82. FED. R. EvmD. 901 advisory committee's note; see 2 Dix ET AL., supra note 2, § 227, at
73.
83. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 542 (D. Md. 2007). For example, in
civil cases, parties can use FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(l)(B) to request that an opponent admit the
"genuineness of documents." A party can also request, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(C),
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Authentication rules address several evidentiary concerns. First, they
prevent fraud by requiring a party to show that its evidence is complete and
unaltered. 84 Additionally, authentication prevents innocent mistakes by ensur-
ing that evidence originates from its named source.85 One example of this
justification is when a plaintiff erroneously attributes a document to the defen-
dant, but in fact, a different person who has the same name signed it.86 Finally,
authentication requirements prevent "jury credulity," or a jury's psychological
tendency to take matters at face value and "assume the connection of a writing
with a particular individual when such a connection is suggested, no matter
how inconclusively, by the writing itself."
87
Although the authentication requirement applies to electronically stored
information, 8 ESI poses several unique authentication concerns. Primarily,
these concerns revolve around the potential for the easier alteration or fabrica-
tion of ESI than traditional forms of physical evidence. 89 Web sites exemplify
these concerns. Authors create, revise, and delete these sites on a daily basis.
90
No external checks exist to ensure that information on a site is accurate.
91
Accordingly, the ease with which a Web site can be altered makes it difficult
for visitors, or a court, to determine whether they "are literally on the same
page when they visit the site on different dates. 92 As Web sites demonstrate,
ESI presents several unique challenges to the application of the authentication
requirement.
that the opposing party admit that documents are authentic. Finally, if proper pretrial disclosure of
documents is made using FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(3), an opposing party's failure to file objections
within fourteen days waives most objections, unless the court excuses the waiver for good cause.
Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 553.
84. See, e.g., 5 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
9:2 (3d ed. 2006); RICE, supra note 9, at 335; John William Strong, Liberalizing the
Authentication of Private Writings, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 284, 285 (1967). Similarly, because the
authentication requirement ensures the trustworthiness of evidence, it can implicate analysis in
other areas, such as hearsay. E.g., Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 542.
85. See, e.g., 5 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 84, § 9:2; Strong, supra note 84, at
285-86.
86. See RICE, supra note 9, at 335; 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2130, at 709-11 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1978).
87. Strong, supra note 84, at 286-87; see 5 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 84, § 9:2;
7 WIGMORE, supra note 86, § 2129, at 704.
88. 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
900.06(l)(b) (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2008) ("The Federal Rules of Evidence, includ-
ing Rule 901, apply to computer-based evidence in the same way as they do to other evidence.");
see Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Vee Vinhnee (In re Vee Vinhnee), 336 B.R. 437,
444 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) ("Authenticating a paperless electronic record, in principle, poses the
same issue as for a paper record, the only difference being the format in which the record is main-
tained: one must demonstrate that the record that has been retrieved from the file, be it paper or
electronic, is the same as the record that was originally placed into the file." (citing FED. R. EVID.
901(a))); Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 541 ("In order for ESI to be admissible, it also must be shown to
be authentic.").
89. See, e.g., ARKFELD, supra note 1, § 8.11(B).
90. See, e.g., RICE, supra note 9, at 311.
91. See id. As a result, authenticating a Web site's content "often poses a difficult hurdle."
Id.
92. Fenner v. Suthers, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1149 (D. Colo. 2002).
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2. General Approaches to Authenticating ESI
Courts have taken widely varying approaches to the authentication of ESI.
Some courts are highly skeptical and adopt a tough standard for authentication.
For example, in St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., the plaintiff
brought claims for personal injuries he allegedly sustained while working on a
boat owned by the defendant.93 The plaintiff attempted to introduce data from
the U.S. Coast Guard's Web site to refute the defendant's claim that it never
owned the ship on which the plaintiff worked.94
The court held that the "[p]laintiff's electronic 'evidence' is totally insuf-
ficient," because "[w]hile some look to the Internet as an innovative vehicle
for communication, the Court continues to warily and wearily view it largely
as one large catalyst for rumor, innuendo, and misinformation." 95 The court
concluded that "this so-called Web provides no way of verifying the authen-
96ticity" of the plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, "[t]here is no way Plaintiff can
overcome the presumption that the information he discovered on the Internet is
inherently untrustworthy." 97 Further, the court noted, "any evidence procured
off the Internet is adequate for almost nothing," and instead of relying upon
such "voodoo information," a hard copy or other legitimate source was re-
quired. 98 Other courts agree with this sentiment and adopt similarly stringent
authentication requirements for ESI.99
In contrast, other courts liberally construe the rules of evidence to maxi-
mize the admissibility of ESI. Under this approach, given the prevalence of
technology in society, a judge will "accept things as authentic if they seem
93. St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. Id. The court went on to note that:
Anyone can put anything on the Internet. No web-site is monitored for accuracy and nothing con-
tained therein is under oath or even subject to independent verification absent underlying docu-
mentation. Moreover, the Court holds no illusions that hackers can adulterate the content on any
website from any location at any time.
Id. at 775.
98. Id. at 775. The same judge reaffirmed these views in several subsequent, more recent,
cases. See, e.g., Perforaciones Maritimas Mexicanas S.A. de C.V. v. Seacor Holdings, Inc., 443 F.
Supp. 2d 825, 832 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Barbour v. Head, 178 F. Supp. 2d 758, 760 n.3 (S.D. Tex.
2001).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that post-
ings on a Web site were not authenticated because they categorically lacked indications of trust-
worthiness); Wady v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1064-65 (C.D.
Cal. 2002); McReynolds v. Lowe's Cos., No. CV08-335-S-EJL, 2008 WL 5234047, at *7 (D.
Idaho Dec. 12,2008); Curran v. Amazon.com, Inc., Civ. Action No. 2:07-0354, 2008 WL 472433,
at *14 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 19, 2008) ("A party's website is self-serving and there is no assurance
that the content is authentic. Relying on a party's website in support of its argument is akin to
relying on their memoranda." (citation omitted)); see also Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co.,
542 F.2d I11, 121 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) ("As one of the many who have
received computerized bills and dunning letters for accounts long since paid, I am not prepared to
accept the product of a computer as the equivalent of Holy Writ. Neither should a District
Judge.").
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authentic, and if no questions are raised by the opponent." 1 ° As stated by one
court, Rule 901(a) is "general or elastic," which caused the court to overrule a
party's authentication objections to various Internet documents, even though
their proponent had not individually authenticated them. 10 1 Courts adopting
this approach generally tend to admit ESI evidence and relegate authentication
concerns to the jury to assess as part of determining its proper weight.'0 2
3. Approaches to ESI Authentication Under Rule 901(b)
Courts also take widely varying approaches to the authentication of ESI
under the illustrations contained in Rule 901(b). 103 First, Rule 901(b)(1) pro-
vides that evidence can be authenticated by "testimony that a matter is what it
is claimed to be."' 1  Different standards have developed for how technical this
testimony must be for ESI, as well as who may testify. For example, for evi-
dence from Web sites, some courts require testimony establishing that the
content of the site is authentic, such as testimony from a corporate representa-
tive that the information on the site was placed there by the corporation.
0 5
These courts, similar to the attitude taken in St. Clair,10 6 are concerned with
the potential for hackers to slip information onto a company's Web site.'
0 7
Other courts have stated that testimony from individuals with knowledge
of the process used to obtain ESI is sufficient for authentication purposes.
100. RICE, supra note 9, at 374.
101. Moose Creek, Inc. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1225 n.4 (C.D.
Cal. 2004).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholding a
district court's decision to admit transcripts of an online chat over the defendant's authentication
objection because "[tjhe ultimate responsibility for determining whether evidence is what its
proponent says it is rests with the jury"); United States v. Meienberg, 263 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th
Cir. 2001) ("Any question as to the accuracy of the printouts, whether resulting from incorrect
data entry or the operation of the computer program, as with inaccuracies in any other type of
business records, would have affected only the weight of the printouts, not their admissibility."
(quoting United States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 1988))); United States v. Tank, 200
F.3d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting, in a criminal case involving chat room logs, that "[t]he
government need only make a prima facie showing of authenticity" (quoting United States v.
Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1342 (9th Cir. 1985))); Olympic Ins. Co. v. H.D. Harrison, Inc., 418 F.2d
669, 670 (5th Cir. 1969) (noting that computer printouts have a "prima facie aura of reliability");
Moose Creek, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1225 n.4; Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194
RMW, 2005 WL 3157472, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005); Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v.
Echostar Satellite Corp., No. 02C3293, 2004 WL 2367740, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2004); RICE,
supra note 9, at 374-75.
103. As previously noted, these illustrations are nonexclusive. See supra note 77 and accom-
panying text.
104. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1).
105. See, e.g., Wady v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1060,
1064 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Terbush v. United States, No. 1:02-CV-5509SMS, 2005 WL 3325954, at
*5 n.4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2005), affid in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 516 F.3d 1125 (9th
Cir. 2008) ("Information on intemet sites presents special problems of authentication. A proponent
should be able to show that the information was posted by the organization/s to which it is attrib-
uted."); see also United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2000) (requiring a party to
show that a Web site posting was actually placed there by the group that operated the site).
106. St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
107. See, e.g., Jackson, 208 F.3d at 637-38.
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When authenticating Internet evidence, this means that testimony from web-
masters, or even simply individuals who viewed the site, will suffice. 108 Simi-
larly, most courts hold that testimony from participants in online chats suffices
to authenticate a transcript of the chat.109 Many courts also adopt analogous
standards for witness testimony authenticating computerized records, requiring
only testimony demonstrating that the witness was present when the informa-
tion was retrieved from the computer. 10 These courts rationalize this approach
by stressing the low threshold required for the authentication requirement to be
satisfied, as well as the opposing party's ability to introduce evidence dis-
proving the information's authenticity. 1'
One example of this approach is United States v. Whitaker." 2 In Whitaker,
the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana.' 13 On ap-
peal, the defendant argued that the prosecution failed to properly authenticate,
and the trial court erred by admitting, printouts of information taken from his
co-conspirator's computer."14 Specifically, the defendant argued that his co-
conspirator assisted law enforcement officers in retrieving the evidence from
the computer, potentially compromising the information's authenticity.
n5
Because the defendant had no evidence disproving the authenticity of the
printouts, the court rejected this argument and concluded the trial court prop-
erly admitted them into evidence. "16
Similar differing standards for the proper form of testimony exist when
authenticating e-mail under Rule 901(b)(1). Some courts analogize e-mails to
108. See, e.g., In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 769, 782-83 (C.D. Cal.
2004) (stating that testimony from a "webmaster or someone else with personal knowledge" is
sufficient for authentification purposes); Nightlight Sys., Inc. v. Nitelites Franchise Sys., Inc., Civ.
Action No. 1:04-CV-2112-CAP, 2007 WL 4563875, at *6 (N.D. Ga. May 11, 2007); St. Luke's
Cataract & Laser Inst., P.A. v. Sanderson, No. 8:06-CV-223-T-MSS, 2006 WL 1320242, at *2
(M.D. Fla. May 12, 2006); Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., No. 02C3293,
2004 WL 2367740, at *6 (N.D. 1II. Oct. 15, 2004).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630-31 (9th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 1998).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding
that printouts of computer records were properly authenticated by testimony from an FBI agent
describing how and when the records were retrieved); United States v. Kassimu, 188 F. App'x
264, 264 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that a witness's familiarity with the procedure of how computer-
ized records were generated was sufficient to authenticate them); SEC v. Berger, 244 F. Supp. 2d
180, 191-92 & n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (affidavit from witness stating that witness had retrieved
documents from company's computers and that the attached documents were the same documents
she retrieved was sufficient to authenticate); United States v. Scott-Emuakpor, No. 1:99-CR-138,
2000 WL 288443, at *14 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 25, 2000) (stating that the authentication requirement
may be satisfied by "testimony of a witness who was present and observed the procedure by which
the documents were obtained from [the diefendant's computers").
111. See, e.g., Telewizja Polska USA, Inc., 2004 WL 2367740, at *6.
112. Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595.
113. Id. at 597.
114. Id. at 599-600.
115. See id. at 602.
116. See id. at 601-02. In fact, the court dismissed the defendant's arguments as "wild-eyed
speculation." Id. at 602.
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regular letters and require testimony from the sender of the e-mail for authen-
tication purposes.' 7 In contrast, other courts require testimony from the recipi-
ent of the e-mail.' 18 Further, some courts state that testimony from either the
sender or the recipient will authenticate an e-mail." 9 Regardless of the testi-
mony necessary, some courts impose an additional requirement that a party
prove that the e-mail was actually received in order for it to be authenti-
cated. 12 As these cases indicate, courts remain divided over how to apply Rule
901(b)(1) to various forms of ESI.
Another illustration in Rule 901(b) states that evidence can be authenti-
cated by "[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinc-
tive characteristics, taken in conjunction with the circumstances." 121 Many
courts have used this illustration to authenticate ESI.122 Indeed, according to
one court, this illustration is "one of the most frequently used to authenticate e-
mail and other electronic records."'
23
However, while courts have been willing to apply Rule 901(b)(4) to au-
thenticate ESI, the degree of distinctiveness demanded by each court varies
significantly. For example, when faced with computerized information, parties
often attempt to introduce a printout. 124 With Internet sources, if this printout
contains the Web site's domain name and a date, these characteristics are often
sufficiently distinctive to qualify under Rule 901(b)(4). 125 Similarly, some
117. See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2006); In re
Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 769, 781 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Middlebrook v.
Anderson, No. Civ.A. 3:04-CV-2294, 2005 WL 350578, at *4 n.7 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2005); see
also Uncle Henry's Inc. v. Plaut Consulting Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D. Me. 2003) (noting
that "e-mails (like letters and other documents) must be properly authenticated or shown to be
self-authenticating"); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117, 124 (D. Mass.
1999) (noting that unless a party verifies the source of an e-mail, that e-mail has "limited value as
evidence").
118. See, e.g., B.S. ex rel. Schneider v. Bd. of Sch. Trs., Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 255 F.
Supp. 2d 891, 893-94 (N.D. Ind. 2003).
119. See, e.g., Tibbetts v. RadioShack Corp., No. 03 C 2249, 2004 WL 2203418, at
*15 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2004).
120. See, e.g., Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 756,
771-72 & n.8 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Fenje v. Feld, 301 F. Supp. 2d 781, 809 (N.D. Ill. 2003);
Schneider, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 893-94.
121. FED. R. EvlD. 901(b)(4).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322-23 (11 th Cir. 2000) (authenti-
cating e-mails); Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (authenticating e-mails); Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Cybemet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1153-54 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (authenticating Web
sites); Brown v. Wireless Networks, Inc., No. C 07-4301 EDL, 2008 WL 4937827, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 17, 2008) (authenticating e-mails); United States ex rel. Parikh v. Premera Blue Cross,
No. C01-0476P, 2006 WL 2841998, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 29, 2006) (using this illustration to
authenticate a printout of a case from Westlaw).
123. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 546 (D. Md. 2007); see Sheldon M.
Finkelstein & Evelyn R. Storch, Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information: It's Still the
Same Old Story, LmG., Spring 2008, at 13, 14.
124. See 5 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 84, § 9:9.
125. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1154; Premier Nutrition, Inc. v. Organic
Food Bar, Inc., No. SACV 06-0827 AG (RNBx), 2008 WL 1913163, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27,
2008); EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. Civ.A. 03-1605, 2004 WL 2347559, at
*2 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2004).
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courts hold that the presence of a unique e-mail address on a printout is
distinctive enough to authenticate it. 126 This approach is premised on the rela-
tively low hurdle posed by the authentication requirement, as well as practi-
cality concerns. 1
27
Again, however, other courts reach a different conclusion. For Internet
sources, these courts hold that the presence of a domain name and date on a
printout is insufficient for authentication purposes. 128 As the Third Circuit
noted when faced with printouts from a Web site, "[a]nyone may purchase an
[I]ntemet address, and so, without proceeding to discovery or some other
means of authentication, it is premature to assume that a webpage is owned by
a company merely because its trade name appears in the uniform resource
locator."' 129 Thus, courts differ in applying this illustration when faced with
ESI.
Another illustration that courts have applied to ESI in drastically different
ways is Rule 901(b)(9), which provides a method of authenticating the results
of a process or system. 30 Some courts remain wary of the potential for fraud
and therefore require parties to present elaborate evidence demonstrating the
integrity of a computerized storage system.131 Other courts, however, indicate
that printouts of preexisting ESI from a computer do not even fall under this
illustration, and that even if they did, a modicum of circumstantial evidence
would suffice to authenticate them.'
32
126. See, e.g., Siddiqui, 235 F.3d at 1322-23; Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 40-41; Fenje v.
Feld, 301 F. Supp. 2d 781, 810 (N.D. 111. 2003); Clement v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 220 F. Supp. 2d
1098, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Parikh, 2006 WL 2841998, at *7; see also Discover Re Managers,
Inc. v. Preferred Employers Group, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-809, 2006 WL 2838901, at *7-8 (D. Conn.
Sept. 29, 2006) (examining circumstantial evidence such as an e-mail address and witness testi-
mony to hold that a party sufficiently authenticated e-mails).
127. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1154; Premier Nutrition, Inc., 2008 WL
1913163, at *6.
128. See, e.g., In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 769, 782-83 (C.D. Cal.
2004) (stating that, for Internet postings, a time stamp and URL on a printout is not sufficient to
authenticate); see also Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 236 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that the
fact that a URL contains a company's name is not enough to authenticate information from that
site).
129. Victaulic Co., 499 F.3d at 236.
130. FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(9) (stating that authentication can occur through "[evidence
describing a process or system used to produce a result and showing that the process or system
produces an accurate result").
131. See, e.g., Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Vee Vinhnee (In re Vee Vinhnee),
336 B.R. 437, 446 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (adopting an eleven-step test for determining when
computerized records fall under this illustration).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Meienberg, 263 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001) ("The
computer printouts were not the result of a process or system used to produce a result; they were
merely printouts of pre-existing records that happened to be stored on a computer. In any event,
the government did offer circumstantial evidence that the computer printouts accurately depicted
the approval numbers ...." (citation omitted)); see also Indianapolis Minority Contractions
Ass'n, Inc. v. Wiley, No. IP94-1175-C-T-G, 1998 WL 1988826, at *7 (S.D. Ind. May 13, 1998).
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Because the authentication methods listed in Rule 901(b) are not exhaus-
tive, many courts have turned to other "outside of the box" methods of au-
thenticating ESI.133 One of these approaches has been to take judicial notice of
specific information or facts relating to ESI.134 For example, this mechanism
could be used to establish commonly known characteristics of computers, how
the Internet operates, the calculations performed by various computer pro-
grams, or other similar facts.
1 35
However, trial courts have split on whether this type of judicial notice is
appropriate. 136 Instead of clarifying this issue, appellate decisions have also
split, as three circuits have concluded that a trial court committed error by
taking judicial notice of facts from a Web site,137 while two circuits have held
133. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 552-54 (D. Md. 2007).
134. See RICE, supra note 9, at 483-89 (discussing how courts apply judicial notice to e-
commerce). Under Rule 201, a court may take judicial notice of a fact "not subject to reasonable
dispute that is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasona-
bly be questioned." FED. R. EvID. 201 (b). A court must take judicial notice of facts "if requested
by a party and supplied with the necessary information." FED. R. EvtD. 201(d).
135. See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 553; see also EDWARD J. IMWtNKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY
FOUNDATIONS 98 (7th ed. 2008) (noting that the proposition that "a person or entity can establish
a Web site that other persons can visit" is "so well established that it is judicially noticeable").
136. Compare Wible v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 2d 956, 965-66 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
(taking judicial notice of various publications on Amazon.com); Town of Southold v. Town of E.
Hampton, 406 F. Supp. 2d 227, 232 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and
remanded on other grounds, 477 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2007) ("This Court may take judicial notice of
the contents of a website assuming, as in this case, its authenticity has not been challenged and 'it
is capable of accurate and ready determination."' (quoting FED. R. EvD. 201)); In re Extradition
of Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725, 731 n.12 (W.D. La. 1999) (taking judicial notice of mileage
based on the MapQuest Web site), with Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1124 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (declining to take judicial notice of a study from a Web site); Nw. Bypass Group v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 488 F. Supp. 2d 22, 25-26 (D.N.H. 2007) (declining to take judicial notice
of the contents of an e-mail); Fenner v. Suthers, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1148-49 (D. Colo. 2002)
(declining to take judicial notice of Web sites, in part, because the court "doubt[ed] that a website
can be said to provide an 'accurate' reference, at least in normal circumstances where the infor-
mation can be modified at will by the web master and, perhaps, others. There is, in other words,
the question of whether the defendants, the magistrate judge, the district judge, and any reviewing
court are literally on the same page when they visit the site on different dates."); San Luis v.
Badgley, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1146 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (declining to take judicial notice of infor-
mation from U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Web site); Knight v. Standard Ins. Co., No. CIV. 07-
1691 WBS EFB, 2008 WL 343852, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2008) ("Taking judicial notice of
facts on a webpage... poses heightened concerns because anyone can say anything on a webpage,
and the posting of a 'fact' on a webpage does not necessarily make it true .... The unregulated
content of webpages poses significant hurdles for the court to find that a webpage, or its host or
author, is necessarily 'a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."' (quoting FED.
R. EVID. 201(b)(2)) (citations omitted)).
137. See Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that the
district court erred in using a company's Web site to establish facts about that company's busi-
ness); Baker v. Barnhart, 457 F.3d 882, 891-92 (8th Cir. 2006) (reversing district court because it
took judicial notice of facts using a printout of an article from a Web site); Scanlan v. Tex. A&M
Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536-37 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that it was improper for a trial court to take
judicial notice of a report located on a Web site).
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that a trial court committed error by failing to judicially notice such facts.' 38
To further complicate this issue, appellate decisions frequently take judicial
notice of facts from the Internet, although typically only from government
Web sites.
139
Modern technology also provides courts with new methods of authenticat-
ing ESI. For example, some courts have recognized that metadata provides a
"useful tool" that can be used to authenticate ESI under Rule 901(b)(4).' 40 This
is because metadata often reveals the date and time ESI was created, as well as
the identity of its creator and any subsequent changes. 14' However, in light of
the potential for manipulation, "this method is not foolproof."'
142
Additionally, courts have used various burden-shifting measures to estab-
lish authenticity. One common approach is to find that producing any ESI as
part of a discovery request establishes its authenticity.143 Some courts create a
rebuttable presumption of authenticity, stating that unless the opposing party
can raise an issue about the authenticity or reliability of the ESI, it will be
admitted. 44 Commentators, however, have sharply criticized this approach as
138. See O'Toole v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 499 F.3d 1218, 1224-25 (10th Cir. 2007)
(noting the propriety of taking judicial notice of information found on the Internet and concluding
that "the district court abused its discretion by failing to take judicial notice of the actual earnings
history provided by Northrop Grumman on the internet"); Denius v. Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919,
926 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that "the district court abused its discretion in withdrawing its judicial
notice of the information from NPRC's official website").
139. See, e.g., Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 995, 998 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (taking judicial
notice of information in the EPA's online database); United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256,
1266 n.9 (11 th Cir. 2000) (taking judicial notice of a fact from the U.S. Naval Observatory Web
site); see also Miller v. Vocational Rehab. Workshop, Inc., Civ. Action No. 2:09-39-JFA-RSC,
2009 WL 482349, at *3 n.3 (D.S.C. Feb. 25, 2009) ("The court may take judicial notice of factual
information located in postings on government websites.").
140. See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 547-48; see also Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230
F.R.D. 640, 646 (D. Kan. 2005).
141. See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 547-48; see also supra notes 39-45 and accompanying
text.
142. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 548.
143. See, e.g., Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 777 n.20 (9th Cir. 2002);
Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kempthorne, 587 F. Supp. 2d 389, 397 (D. Conn. 2008); In re
Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 769, 781 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (e-mails); Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1153-54 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Pierre v. RBC
Liberty Life Ins., Civ. Action No. 05-1042-C, 2007 WL 2071829, at *2 (M.D. La. July 13, 2007)
(e-mails); Sklar v. Clough, Civ. Action No. 1:06-CV-0627, 2007 WL 2049698, at *4 (N.D. Ga.
July 6, 2007) ("The e-mails in question were produced by Defendants during the discovery proc-
ess. Such documents are deemed authentic when offered by a party opponent."); Superhighway
Consulting, Inc. v. Techwave, Inc., No. 98 CV 5502, 1999 WL 1044870, at *2 (N.D. 111. Nov. 16,
1999) (e-mails); Indianapolis Minority Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Wiley, No. IP94-1175-C-T-G,
1998 WL 1988826, at *6 (S.D. Ind. May 13, 1998). But see Kirby v. Anthem, Inc., No. 1P98-
0954-C-H/G, 2001 WL 1168166, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 8, 2001) ("The mere fact of production is
not sufficient by itself to establish the authenticity of the document to support its admission into
evidence.").
144. See, e.g., Midwest Retailers Ass'n, Ltd. v. City of Toledo, 582 F. Supp. 2d 931,934-35
(N.D. Ohio 2008); Mortgage Mkt. Guide, L.L.C. v. Freedman Report, L.L.C., No. 06-CV-140,
2008 WL 2991570, at *12 n.3 (D.N.J. July 28, 2008); Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar
Satellite Corp., No. 02C3293, 2004 WL 2367740, at *6 (N.D. 11. Oct. 15, 2004) (Web site).
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ignoring both traditional authentication principles and the susceptibility of ESI
to hacking. 
45
A related question with ESI is whether, and if so under what circum-
stances, ESI can be self-authenticating. Similar to authentication generally, a
limited number of courts have found that some forms of ESI, such as Web
sites, can never be self-authenticating. 146 Other courts, however, have pre-
sumed that e-mails are self-authenticating. 147 Of the courts that recognize the
potential for self-authentication, there is near unanimity that government Web
sites are self-authenticating as official publications under Rule 902(5). 148 Be-
yond that, the requirements for self-authentication vary.149
As the preceding analysis indicates, "there is a wide disparity between the
most lenient positions courts have taken in accepting electronic records as
authentic and the most demanding requirements that have been imposed."
150
Accordingly, litigants remain uncertain about the steps that courts will require
them to take to authenticate electronic evidence.151
145. See, e.g., Eric Van Buskirk & Vincent T. Liu, Digital Evidence: Challenging the
Presumption of Reliability, 1 J. DIGITAL FORENSIC PRAC. 19 (2006); Paul, supra note 9.
146. See, e.g., In re Homestore.com, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 782 ("Printouts from a web site do
not bear the indicia of reliability demanded for other self-authenticating documents under Fed. R.
Evid. 902."); Sun Prot. Factory, Inc. v. Tender Corp., No. 604CV732ORLI9KRS, 2005 WL
2484710, at *6 n.4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2005) ("[W]ebsites are not self-authenticating." (citing In re
Homestore.com, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 782)).
147. See, e.g., Superhighway Consulting, Inc., 1999 WL 1044870, at *2 (indicating that e-
mails and faxes are self-authenticating under Rule 902(17) unless opposing party can produce
evidence disputing their authenticity).
148. See, e.g., Williams v. Long, 585 F. Supp. 2d 679, 689-90 (D. Md. 2008); United States
v. 52" Flat Screen Television, No. l:08-cv-1534-OWW-SMS, 2009 WL 1770134, at *4 (E.D. Cal.
June 23, 2009); United States ex rel. Parikh v. Premera Blue Cross, No. C01-0476P, 2006 WL
2841998, at *3-4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 29, 2006) (finding that a government site was self-
authenticating, but a printout from an online newspaper was not); Colt Def. L.L.C. v. Bushmaster
Firearms, Inc., No. Civ.04-240-P-S, 2005 WL 2293909, at *5 n.10 (D. Me. Sept. 20, 2005) (noting
that "printouts from government web sites have been held to be self-authenticating pursuant to
Federal Rules of Evidence 901(a) and/or 902(5)"); EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No.
Civ.A. 03-1605, 2004 WL 2347559, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2004) (concluding that postings on a
Web site of the U.S. Census Bureau were self-authenticating); Hispanic Broad. Corp. v. Educ.
Media Found., No. CV027134CAS, 2003 WL 22867633, at *5 n.5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2003)
(noting that "records from government websites, such as the FCC website, are self-
authenticating"); Sannes v. Jeff Wyler Chevrolet, Inc., No. C- 1-97-930, 1999 WL 33313134, at *3
n.3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 1999) ("The FTC press releases, printed from the FTC's government
world wide web page, are self-authenticating official publications under Rule 902(5) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.").
149. Compare United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 39 & n.1 (D.D.C. 2006) (stat-
ing that a party must produce more than basic information in an affidavit to fall within Rule
902(1 l)'s provision for the self-authentication of certified domestic records of regularly conducted
activity), with DirecTV, Inc. v. Murray, 307 F. Supp. 2d 764, 772 (D.S.C. 2004) (affidavit with
basic information sufficient for Rule 902(11)). This self-authentication provision is closely related
to the business records exception to the hearsay rules. See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel Amer. Ins. Co.,
241 F.R.D. 534, 552 (D. Md. 2007) (drawing parallel between 902(11) and hearsay analysis under
803(6)); see also infra note 185.
150. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 558; see Finkelstein & Storch, supra note 123, at 14.
151. See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 559.
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B. Hearsay
1. General Hearsay Rules
The Federal Rules of Evidence generally prohibit a party from introducing
evidence containing hearsay.' 5 2 Rule 801 defines hearsay as "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." 153 A statement is
defined as "(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a per-
son, if it is intended by the person as an assertion."'' 5 4 The Rules exclude, in
limited circumstances, prior statements by a witness and a party opponent's
admission from the definition of hearsay. 5 5 Rule 803 also provides twenty-
three separate exceptions to the hearsay rules.' 56 Basically, these exceptions
provide for the admission of hearsay in circumstances where the statement has
indications of trustworthiness. 157
The hearsay rules seek to promote the policy goal of ensuring the reliabil-
ity and trustworthiness of evidence.' Accordingly, these rules generally ex-
clude hearsay because an out-of-court declarant is not subject to the reliability
safeguards present with in-court testimony.' 59 Specifically, an out-of-court
declarant is not speaking under oath while making the statement. 16 The op-
posing party is also unable to test potential weaknesses in the declarant's
statement through cross-examination, the "greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth."'16 1 Further, by generally requiring a declarant's
152. FED. R. EvID. 802 ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Con-
gress.").
153. FED. R. EvID. 801 (c).
154. FED. R. EvID. 801(a).
155. See FED. R. EvtD. 801(d).
156. See FED. R. EvID. 803. In criminal cases, however, hearsay may be admissible pursuant
to an exception, yet be excluded under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See
generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (outlining the history of the Confrontation
Clause and how it interacts with the hearsay rules in criminal cases).
157. See, e.g., RICE, supra note 9, at 409; 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 1420, at 251-52 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1974). There is also a catchall
residual exception provided for in Rule 807. See FED. R. EvID. 807.
158. See, e.g., RICE, supra note 9, at 403. For a complete discussion of the rationales sup-
porting the hearsay rules, as well as their historical origins, see generally Edmund M. Morgan,
Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948).
159. See, e.g., Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV.
51, 55-56 (1987).
160. See, e.g., Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 436 (1836) (noting that the exclusion
of hearsay is justified, in part, because of "the general consideration that it is not upon oath"); 2
Dix ET AL., supra note 2, § 245, at 125-26; 5 WIGMORE, supra note 157, § 1420, at 7-10.
161. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A
TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367
(3d ed. 1940)); see also Ellicott, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 436 (noting that the exclusion of hearsay is
justified, in part, because "the party affected by it has no opportunity of cross-examination"); 2
Dix ET AL., supra note 2, § 245, at 126 ("The lack of any opportunity for the adversary to cross-
examine the absent declarant whose out-of-court statement is reported is today accepted as the
main justification for the exclusion of hearsay."); Park, supra note 159, at 55-56 (noting that
50 JURIMETRICS
Time for an Upgrade
personal presence at trial, the fact finder has the opportunity to observe the
declarant's demeanor for purposes of evaluating credibility. 162 Thus, these
concerns, along with a general fear of potential fabrication or fraud, justify the
hearsay rules.' 
63
It is important to note that a significant amount of ESI does not fall within
the definition of hearsay. Hearsay requires a "statement," which must be made
by a "declarant. ' 164 Because the rules define a declarant as a "person who
makes a statement, ' 165 many courts conclude that an electronically generated
record that is solely the creation of a computerized system or process is not
hearsay. 166 As a result, any information automatically generated by a com-
puter, including metadata, does not fall within these rules. 16 7 For example, one
court concluded that header information accompanying an electronic image,
which a computer automatically generated when the defendant uploaded the
image to the Internet, was not subject to the hearsay rules. 168 Information cre-
ated by a person using a computer, however, such as an e-mail, remains a
"statement" and subject to the requirements of the hearsay rules.' 69 Notably,
"hearsay's fundamental evidentiary flaw is the absence of an opportunity to reveal an out-of-court
declarant's weaknesses through cross-examination").
162. See, e.g., 2 Dix ET AL., supra note 2, § 245, at 126. Personal presence also "eliminates
the danger that the witness reporting the out-of-court statement may do so inaccurately." Id.
163. See, e.g., Ellicott, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 436 (noting that hearsay is "peculiarly liable to be
obtained by fraudulent contrivances"); Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 295-96 (1813)
(Marshall, C.J.) (noting the "frauds which might be practiced" under the cover of hearsay); Park,
supra note 159, at 56-57.
164. FED. R. EvID. 801.
165. FED. R. EvtD. 801(b) (emphasis added).
166. See, e.g., United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1263-64 (1 1th Cir. 2008) (finding
that evidence was not hearsay because "the statements in question are the statements of ma-
chines"); United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2007) ("Only a person may be
a declarant and make a statement. Accordingly, 'nothing "said" by a machine ... is hearsay."'
(quoting 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 380, at
65 (2d ed. 1994))); United States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 505 (3d Cir. 2003); Lorraine v.
Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 564 (D. Md. 2007).
167. See RICE, supra note 9, at 417 ("Although mechanical devices, such as computers, can
record hearsay statements from other sources, such as business records and third-party statements,
such devices do not create an additional hearsay link."); RIEDY ET AL., supra note 12, at 201
("There is substantial authority for the proposition that information that is neither created nor
maintained by a human--or computer-generated records-should not be considered hearsay."); 5
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 88, § 900.07(1 )(a) ("Computer-generated data, which includes
metadata, automated teller machine transactions, and direct-dialed telephone calls, are extrajudi-
cial statements that are not hearsay."); Bums et al., supra note 52, at 224 (noting that "the hearsay
rule... does not apply to many types of electronic evidence").
168. See United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2005).
169. See, e.g., Hamilton, 413 F.3d at 1142 n.4 (noting the distinction, for purposes of the
hearsay rule, between information that is computer-generated and information that is merely
stored electronically using a computer); Means v. Cullen, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1151-52 (W.D.
Wis. 2003) (noting that none of the hearsay exceptions applied and thus "the truth of the matter
asserted in the e-mail is hearsay and cannot be considered"); Nokes v. U.S. Coast Guard, 282 F.
Supp. 2d 1085, 1089 (D. Minn. 2003) ("[A]s an out of court statement offered as proof of the
matter it asserts, the e-mail is inadmissible hearsay.").
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like all hearsay, this information may still fall within the non-hearsay provi-
sions of Rule 801(d).
170
When the rules apply, however, electronically stored information poses
several potential hearsay issues. Some ESI evidence, such as e-mails, e-mail
chains, and Internet service provider logs, raises issues regarding how such
evidence fits within the various exceptions contained in Rule 803.171 Further,
ESI may present multiple levels of hearsay, such as when an e-mail contains
information that the sender received from another source. 172 Overall, though,
"[lhe application of the hearsay rule to electronic evidence does not differ
from its application to all other forms of evidence," but the rules are "made
more difficult to apply because of the new context."'
173
2. ESI, Hearsay, and the Rule 803 Exceptions
Courts have taken a wide variety of approaches when addressing the hear-
say issues presented by electronically stored information. Similar to how
courts address the authentication of ESI, two schools of thought exist. One
approach has been to recognize how commonplace electronic information is
and to liberally interpret the hearsay rules to ensure its admissibility. 174 In
170. See, e.g., Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kempthorne, 587 F. Supp. 2d 389, 398 (D.
Conn. 2008) (concluding that e-mails were admissions of party-opponents and therefore excluded
from the definition of hearsay under Rule 801 (d)(2)(D)); United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp.
2d 36, 43 (D.D.C. 2006) ("The context and content of certain e-mails demonstrate clearly that [the
defendant] 'manifested an adoption or belief in the truth of the statements of other people as he
forwarded their e-mails. They therefore are admissible as adoptive admissions under Rule
801(d)(2)(B)." (citation omitted)); X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, No. CV06-7608-VBF(JCX), 2007 WL
790061, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007); Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., No. Civ.A. 02-2104,
2005 WL 2106582, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2005). Accord United States v. Dupre, 462 F.3d 131,
136-37 (2d Cir. 2006); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Lozen Int'l, L.L.C., 285 F.3d 808, 821 (9th Cir.
2002).
171. See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 562 ("Hearsay issues are pervasive when electronically
stored and generated evidence is introduced.").
172. See, e.g., ARKFELD, supra note 1, § 8.13(C)(4)(a); RICE, supra note 9, at 403. For
example, "e-mail strings" or "chains" are "[a] series of e-mails linked together by e-mail responses
or forwards. The series of email messages created through multiple responses and answers to an
originating message." SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY, supra note 12, at 19. When confronted
with such evidence containing multiple levels of hearsay, each level must satisfy a hearsay excep-
tion in order for that level to be admissible. See FED. R. EVID. 805 ("Hearsay included within
hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms
with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules.").
173. RICE, supra note 9, at 403.
174. See, e.g., Border Collie Rescue, Inc. v. Ryan, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1350 n.16 (M.D.
Fla. 2006) ("Even though [the parties] authenticate the website printouts, they do not establish that
the website printouts are nonhearsay, plaintiffs' business records, or subject to some other hearsay
exception. The Court nevertheless considered the website for purposes of summary judgment as it
deems this evidence the type that can be reduced to admissible form at trial."); Microware Sys.
Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1211 n.2 (S.D. Iowa 2000) ("As to the
internet and e-mail postings, ... the Court recognizes Apple's hearsay concerns, but will receive
the evidence in any case .... [lln a case involving an industry where e-mail and internet commu-
nication are a fact of life, these technical deficiencies must go to the weight of such evidence,
rather than to their admissibility."); Van Westrienen v. Americontinental Collection Corp., 94 F.
Supp. 2d 1087, 1109 (D. Or. 2000) (holding that content of a Web site was not hearsay when a
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contrast, another approach has been to remain skeptical of new sources of
information and the potential for fraud or manipulation and, therefore, strictly
apply the hearsay rules to severely restrict the admissibility of ESI.
17 5
Generally, courts follow a more traditional analysis when applying most
of the hearsay exceptions in Rule 803 to ESI.17 6 For example, courts examine
the same factors when determining whether a statement in an e-mail consti-
tutes a present sense impression.17 7 Similar trends exist for the exception for
statements of a declarant's then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condi-
tion. 178
One hearsay exception that has not been applied consistently to ESI is the
business records exception. 79 This exception states that the hearsay rule does
not exclude various forms of business records if they meet several elements.'
80
First, the records must be "made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge."' 18' Second, the records must be
"kept in the course of a regularly conducted acti*vity."' 182 Finally, it must be
part of the business's regular activity to make the record. 183 The basis for this
exception is that a business is motivated to ensure that its regularly kept re-
witness testifies as to what he or she viewed); In re Dow Coming Corp., 250 B.R. 298,
318 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000) ("There is nothing in the record to suggest that these computer-
generated reports are untrustworthy."); see also United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 910, 915 (lst
Cir. 1991 ) (noting that the elements of the business records exception are sufficient to indicate the
trustworthiness of computer records, absent counsel's ability to point to specific evidence of
untrustworthiness); V Cable, Inc. v. Budnick, 23 F. App'x 64, 65-66 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding no
error in the admission of computer printouts over defendant's hearsay objection, despite a break in
the chain of custody, because there were other indications of trustworthiness).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2000); Tolliver v. Fed.
Republic of Nig., 265 F. Supp. 2d 873, 876 (W.D. Mich. 2003); St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster &
Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (noting that "any evidence procured off
the Internet is adequate for almost nothing, even under the most liberal interpretation of the hear-
say exception rules").
176. See, e.g., H. Christopher Boehning & Daniel J. Toal, Electronic Discovery: Overcoming
Evidentiary Hurdles, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 23, 2007, at 5 ("Many of the exceptions [to the hearsay rules]
are applied to ESI in a wholly conventional manner.").
177. See FED. R. Evm. 803(1); United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 99 (D. Mass. 1997);
Canatxx Gas Storage Ltd. v. Silverhawk Capital Partners, L.L.C., Civ. Action No. H-06-1330,
2008 WL 1999234, at *13-14 (S.D. Tex. May 8, 2008); New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. C1V
A.98-1233, 2002 WL 649951, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2002).
178. See FED. R. EVtD. 803(3); Mclnnis v. Fairfield Communities, Inc., 458 F.3d 1129,
1143-44 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 44 (D.D.C. 2006);
Tibbetts v. RadioShack Corp., No. 03 C 2249, 2004 WL 2203418, at *13 (N.D. 11. Sept. 29,
2004).
179. See FED. R. EviD. 803(6); Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 572 (D.
Md. 2007); Bums et al., supra note 52, at 225 (noting that the business records exception is the
most commonly litigated hearsay exception for electronic evidence that contains hearsay).
180. See FED. R. EViD. 803(6).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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cords are accurate and precise. 84 The exception is also tied to the method of
self-authentication in Rule 902(1 1).185
Most courts agree that electronically stored information qualifies for the
business records exception. 186 Indeed, the Advisory Committee noted that
"[t]he form which the 'record' may assume under the rule is described
broadly" and "includes, but is by no means limited to, electronic computer
storage. ' 87 However, as one court observed, decisions applying the business
records exception to ESI "demonstrate a continuum running from cases where
the court was very lenient in admitting electronic business records, without
demanding analysis, to those in which the court took a very demanding ap-
proach and scrupulously analyzed every element of the exception."
' ' 88
These differences are similar to the differences in how courts view ESI for
purposes of authentication.' 89 Some courts emphasize the potential for the
altering of electronic records and require an enhanced showing to ensure that
proffered evidence is identical to the original document. 190 Many courts, how-
ever, have a significantly less stringent standard for computerized business
records.'91 Indeed, as one court noted, "[t]he existence of an air-tight security
system is not ... a prerequisite to the admissibility of computer printouts."'
' 92
184. See, e.g., 2 DIX ET AL., supra note 2, § 286, at 304.
185. See FED. R. EVID. 902(11) (stating that extrinsic evidence of authenticity is not required
for "[tihe original or a duplicate of a domestic record of a regularly conducted activity that would
be admissible under Rule 803(6) if accompanied by a written declaration of its custodian or other
qualified person"); see also Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 348 F. Supp. 2d 698, 701 (E.D.
Va. 2004) ("Rules 803(6) and 902(11) go hand in hand.").
186. See, e.g., DAVID F. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK § 16:5 (4th ed. 2001); RIEDY ET AL.,
supra note 12, at 199 (noting that "with an appropriate foundation, computer printouts qualify as
business records"); see also United States v. Hutson, 821 F.2d 1015, 1019 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Com-
puter records are admissible if the requirements of Rule 803(6) have been met." (citing United
States v. Young Brothers Inc., 728 F.2d 682, 693 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 881
(1984))); United States v. Croft, 750 F.2d 1354, 1364 (7th Cir. 1984) ("It is well-settled that
computer data compilations may constitute business records for purposes of Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)
and may be admitted at trial if a proper foundation is established.").
187. FED. R. EvID. 803 advisory committee's note ("The form which the 'record' may
assume under the rule is described broadly as a 'memorandum, report, record, or data compilation,
in any form.' The expression 'data compilation' is used as broadly descriptive of any means of
storing information other than the conventional words and figures in written or documentary form.
It includes, but is by no means limited to, electronic computer storage.").
188. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 572 (D. Md. 2007).
189. See supra Part II.A.2.
190. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Vee Vinhnee (In re Vee Vinhnee), 336 B.R.
437, 444 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005); see also Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 573 (describing this case as
"[p]erhaps the most demanding analysis regarding the admissibility of electronic evidence under
the business record exception to the hearsay rule").
191. See, e.g., United States v. Fujii, 301 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2002); Sea-Land Serv., Inc.
v. Lozen Int'l, L.L.C., 285 F.3d 808, 819-20 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d
438, 451-53 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Kassimu, 188 F. App'x 264, 264 (5th Cir. 2006);
McAninch v. Fed. Express Corp., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1036 (S.D. Iowa 2005); see also 2 DIX ET
AL., supra note 2, § 294, at 325 (noting that "the trend among courts has been to treat computer
records like other business records and not to require the proponent of the evidence initially to
show trustworthiness beyond the general requirements of the rule").
192. United States v. Glasser, 773 F.2d 1553, 1559 (11 th Cir. 1985).
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Courts also differ about how the exception should apply to e-mails. Many,
if not most, courts impose stringent requirements for e-mail to qualify under
the business records exception.' 93 For example, some courts require a propo-
nent of e-mail evidence to prove not only that it was the business's routine
practice to send that type of e-mail, but also that the business had policies
requiring the preservation of those types of e-mails.' 94 In contrast, other courts
have held that the sending of an e-mail in the regular course of business is
sufficient. 95 Similar differences exist over how the exception applies to e-mail
chains. 19 6 Accordingly, "[t]he lesson to be taken from these cases is that some
courts will require the proponent of electronic business records or e-mail evi-
dence to make an enhanced showing in addition to meeting each element of
the business records exception.
' ' 9 7
C. Best Evidence Rule
1. The Best Evidence Rule Generally
Another barrier to the admissibility of evidence is the best evidence
rule.1 98 Generally, the best evidence rule, also known as the original writing
193. See REEDY ET AL., supra note 12, at 197.
194. See, e.g., Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kempthome, 587 F. Supp. 2d 389, 397-98 (D.
Conn. 2008); United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 98-99 (D. Mass. 1997); Westfed Holdings,
Inc. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 544, 565-66 (2003), affid in part and rev'd in part, 407 F.3d
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc., 298 B.R. 240, 242-43 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2003); Canatxx Gas Storage Ltd. v. Silverhawk Capital Partners, L.L.C., Civ. Action No. H-
06-1330, 2008 WL 1999234, at *12 (S.D. Tex. May 8, 2008); see also Monotype Corp. P.L.C. v.
Int'l Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 450 (9th Cir. 1994) (excluding an e-mail under Rule 803(6)
because "[e]-mail is far less of a systematic business activity than a monthly inventory printout. E-
mail is an ongoing electronic message and retrieval system whereas an electronic inventory re-
cording system is a regular, systematic function of a bookkeeper prepared in the course of busi-
ness.").
195. See, e.g., DirecTV, Inc. v. Murray, 307 F. Supp. 2d 764, 772-73 (D.S.C. 2004); Pierre
v. RBC Liberty Life Ins., Civ. Action No. 05-1042-C, 2007 WL 2071829, at *2 (M.D. La. July 13,
2007); see also Tibbetts v. RadioShack Corp., No. 03 C 2249, 2004 WL 2203418, at *15 (N.D. 111.
Sept. 29, 2004) (report, in form of an attachment to e-mail, was made in ordinary course of busi-
ness, even though it was not signed and lacked the "footer" normally included in such reports).
196. Compare United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 2006) ("The defen-
dant is free to raise [the issue of alteration] with the jury and put on evidence that e-mails are
capable of being altered before they are passed on. Absent specific evidence showing alteration,
however, the Court will not exclude any embedded e-mails because of the mere possibility that it
can be done."), with Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, 348 F. Supp. 2d 698, 706-07 (E.D. Va.
2004) (concluding that unless each element of the business records exception is satisfied for all
statements made in the e-mail chain, the e-mail lacks trustworthiness and the exception will not
apply), and New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV A.98-1233, 2002 WL 649951, at *5 (D.D.C.
Apr. 12, 2002) (similar holding to Rambus Inc.).
197. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 574 (D. Md. 2007).
198. The nomenclature "best evidence rule" may be somewhat of a misnomer, in part be-
cause it does not require a party to produce the best available evidence. See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D.
at 576 n.54. Further, the principle is outlined in the Federal Rules of Evidence as a series of rules,
rather than a single "best evidence rule." See FED. R. EvtD. 1001-08. For a discussion of the
historical origins of the rule, see generally Edward W. Cleary & John W. Strong, The Best
Evidence Rule: An Evaluation in Context, 51 IOWA L. REv. 825 (1966).
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rule,199 states that "[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or photo-
graph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required. ' '2° Because
of the broad definition of "writing" and "recording," this requirement clearly
applies to electronic evidence.
201
Unlike other admissibility requirements, the definition of "original" in the
federal rules explicitly addresses computer-generated evidence, stating that if
"data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output
readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an 'original.' 20 2 In
other words, the physical medium in which ESI is stored, such as a hard drive,
does not need to be admitted into evidence. 20 3 Instead, a printout of that infor-
mation constitutes an "original" and satisfies the best evidence rule.204
If an original is lost or destroyed, a party has several options. First, a du-
plicate205 is admissible to the same extent as an original, "unless (1) a genuine
question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circum-
stances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. 20 6
Further, an original is not required if the original is lost or destroyed, not ob-
tainable, in the possession of a party opponent, or if it relates to a collateral
matter. 207 If any of these circumstances exist, all forms of secondary evi-
dence 208 are admissible to prove the contents of the writing.
209
There are several justifications for the best evidence rule. One rationale
espoused by courts and commentators is the prevention of fraud.210 Another
199. See FED. R. EvID. 1001 advisory committee's note.
200. FED. R. EviD. 1002.
201. See FED. R. EVIl. 1001 (1) ("'Writings' and 'recordings' consist of letters, words, or
numbers, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photo-
graphing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data compila-
tion."); see also id. advisory committee's note (stating that "the considerations underlying the rule
dictate its expansion to include computers, photographic systems, and other modem develop-
ments").
202. FED. R. EvtD. 1001(3); see also DirecTV v. Reyes, No. 03 C 8056, 2006 WL 533364, at
*7 (N.D. HIl. Mar. 1, 2006) ("A computer printout of information stored on a computer is an
'original' for purposes of FED. R. Evim. 1001(3) and 1002."). Accordingly, there are fewer re-
ported decisions addressing how the rule applies to ESI. See Bums et al., supra note 52, at 226.
203. See, e.g., RICE, supra note 9, at 303-04.
204. See FED. R. EviD. 1001(3); 2 DIX ET AL., supra note 2, § 235, at 97-98; RICE, supra
note 9, at 303-04.
205. FED. R. EvID. 1001(4) ("A 'duplicate' is a counterpart produced by the same impression
as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and
miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other
equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original.").
206. FED. R. EviD. 1003.
207. See FED. R. EvID. 1004.
208. This term derives from the use of the phrase "other evidence" in Rule 1004. See 5
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 84, § 10:26. Secondary evidence can include a copy of a
lost writing or testimony as to its contents. See id.; see also Wiley v. United States, 257 F.2d 900,
909 (8th Cir. 1958) ("Secondary evidence of a document may consist of a copy proved to be
correct, or, when the absence of the primary evidence is satisfactorily accounted for, oral evidence
of the contents by one who has seen it and knows its contents.").
209. See FED. R. EVID. 1004.
210. See, e.g., United States v. Reyburn, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 352, 367 (1832); Renner v. Bank of
Columbia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 581, 596-97 (1824); United States v. Holton, 116 F.3d 1536, 1545
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premise for the rule is simply the law's preference for the written word over
oral testimony.21 Essentially, this rationale revolves around a desire for accu-
racy and precision. 212 Finally, the rule also is concerned about completeness,
or potential "internal evidence" that is present in the original but not contained
in a copy.21 3 As Wigmore stated when explaining this rationale, "the original
may contain, and the copy will lack, such features ... as may afford the oppo-
nent valuable means of learning legitimate objections to the significance of the
document."
214
ESI presents several unique best evidence issues. Because every printout
is an "original," a party could cut and paste information from a Web site into a
word processor and print it for use in court, and theoretically this would satisfy
the best evidence rule. 2 15 Among other problems, this "original" may lack the
potentially useful metadata contained in an electronic version. 2 16 For these
reasons, ESI poses many challenges to the application of the best evidence
rule.
2. ESI and the Applicability of the Best Evidence Rule
Several differences have arisen in how courts apply the best evidence rule
to ESI. First, courts differ on whether electronic modifications to ESI consti-
tute violations of the rule. Some courts hold that the best evidence rule pre-
cludes the admission of ESI if there are electronic modifications.217 The major-
(D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Howard, 953 F.2d 610, 613 (11 th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 134 (5th Cir. 1989); 2 DIx ET AL., supra note 2, § 232, at 88-89; 1 SIMON
GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 82, at 93 (2d prtg. 1972). This was the
predominant rationale provided by commentators in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but
has played a lesser role in modem commentary. See Cleary & Strong, supra note 198, at 827.
Wigmore sharply critiqued this rationale. See 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 1180 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1972).
211. See, e.g., Seiler v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 808 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1986); 2 Dix ET AL.,
supra note 2, § 232, at 88; Cleary & Strong, supra note 198, at 828.
212. See Cleary & Strong, supra note 198, at 828.
213. See 2 DIX ET AL., supra note 2, § 232, at 88-89; Cleary & Strong, supra note 198, at
829-30 (stating that "something of value may be gained from a physical inspection of the original
by someone ... which cannot be had from any copy, however produced"); see also Gordon v.
United States, 344 U.S. 414, 421 (1953) ("The elementary wisdom of the best evidence rule rests
on the fact that the document is a more reliable, complete and accurate source of information as to
its contents and meaning than anyone's description .....
214. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 210, § 1179, at 417.
215. See RICE, supra note 9, at 304; see also Porter v. United States, No. 08-CV- 1497 (CPS),
2008 WL 5451011, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2008) (finding that a printout of a cut-and-pasted
transcript of an Internet instant messenger conversation satisfied the best evidence rule). See
generally Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybemet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1155 & n.4 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (stating that computer printouts satisfy the best evidence rule).
216. See ARKFELD, supra note 1, § 8.12(D).
217. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 488 F. Supp. 2d 866, 870-71 (D. Neb. 2007) (ex-
cluding logs of chat room conversations when the government attempted to introduce a modified
"cut and paste" version instead of the original computer file); see also In re Gulph Woods Corp.,
82 B.R. 373, 377 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) ("[A] computerized record may be admitted into evi-
dence as an 'original' only after the court has made a fact-specific determination as to the intent of
the drafters and the accuracy of the documents.").
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ity of courts, however, hold that modified ESI remains an original and that the
best evidence rule, therefore, does not apply.218 One court held in this manner
even though the conversion of an electronic file to a different format resulted
in the loss of metadata that could have been useful to the opposing party in
subsequent proceedings.
219
The admissibility of secondary evidence also presents problems in con-
nection with ESI. Indeed, in light of the numerous ways that ESI can be de-
stroyed, secondary evidence is often admissible. 22 Courts also adapt their
interpretation of the rule providing for the admissibility of secondary evidence,
Rule 1004, to accommodate modern technology. For example, one court held
that the plaintiff could testify about the content of an e-mail because it had
been forwarded to the defendant, causing it to be in the defendant's possession
as required by Rule 1004.221 Other courts have used burden-shifting measures
to require the opposing party to prove that the use of secondary evidence is
improper. 222 Some courts, however, have been more hesitant to allow secon-
dary evidence when a party attempts to introduce ESI and have readily ex-
cluded it.223 These differences illustrate the division that currently exists as to
the proper application of the best evidence rule to ESI.
III. AMENDING THE FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE TO ADDRESS ESI
As the previous sections indicate, whether ESI will be admissible and, if it
is, the procedural mechanisms for ensuring its admission, vary significantly
from court to court. Generally, these varying standards reflect the theoretical
differences in how courts approach ESI. Some courts, such as the St. Clair
224
court, are inherently skeptical of ESI evidence and, therefore, strictly apply the
218. See, e.g., United States v. Seifert, 351 F. Supp. 2d 926, 927-28 (D. Minn. 2005) (hold-
ing that an electronic video was admissible even though it had been enhanced and edited); United
States v. Sattar, No. 02 CR 395(JGK), 2003 WL 22510435, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2003)
(approving the production of ESI in a different file format).
219. See Sattar, 2003 WL 22510435, at *1-2 (concluding that the production of ESI in an
altered format was acceptable, even if that meant that metadata was no longer present).
220. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 580 (D. Md. 2007); Porter, 2008
WL 5451011, at *4.
221. See King v. Kirkland's Stores, Inc., No. 2:04-cv-1055, 2006 WL 2239203, at *4-5
(M.D. Ala. Aug. 4, 2006) (plaintiff allowed to testify as to the content of an e-mail because the e-
mail was forwarded to the defendant and therefore allegedly in defendant's possession).
222. See United States v. Culberson, No. 05-80972, 2007 WL 1266131, at *2-4 (E.D. Mich.
Apr. 27, 2007) (placing the burden on the defendant to prove that the original e-mails were not
available and thus that a transcript was inadmissible); see also Pfeffer v. Hilton Grand Vacations
Co., L.L.C., No. CV. 07-00492 DAE-BAK, 2009 WL 37519, at *7 (D. Haw. Jan. 7, 2009) (re-
jecting a party's best evidence rule objection and concluding that anomalies in an e-mail were "not
sufficient to make the e-mail so inherently untrustworthy that it should be disregarded").
223. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 363 F.3d 947, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding
that a police officer's testimony about GPS data violated best evidence rle).
224. St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
50 JURIMETRICS
Timefor an Upgrade
Federal Rules of Evidence.225 Others more liberally interpret the rules and
adapt them to the unique characteristics of ESI.226
In light of these differences, amendments to the rules would provide more
guidance to courts and result in a more uniform approach to the admissibility
of ESI, reducing the judge-dependent nature of how the rules are currently
applied. These amendments should also be coupled with increased training and
educational programs for federal judges to create additional consistency and
predictability. 227 Overall, while the e-discovery amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure began to address the problems caused by ESI before
trial, it is time to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to address the unique
evidentiary issues presented by ESI at trial.
A. Are Amendments Necessary?
Initially, it is important to consider whether amendments to the Federal
Rules of Evidence are the appropriate mechanism to address these concerns.
After all, decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence have traditionally
been left to the discretion of the trial court.228 As a result, the current Federal
Rules of Evidence are flexible enough to accommodate the changes brought
by ESI,229 particularly because Rule 102 instructs courts to construe the rules
to "promote the growth and development of the law of evidence." 230 This
discretion is especially appropriate in the context of ESI, as rapid technologi-
cal changes consistently create new challenges that require case-by-case
225. See 5 MUELLER & KiRKPATRICK, supra note 84, § 9:9.
226. See id.
227. See Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the Courtroom, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for Institutional Reform and More Judicial
Acceptance, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 277-78 (2000) (discussing how consistency and predict-
ability would improve if federal judges received additional training about computer-generated
evidence).
228. See, e.g., RICE, supra note 9, at 492; David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in
Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 937, 956-57 (1990) (noting that "rulemakers have recognized
the unique position of the trial judge, who observes the context in which particular evidentiary
issues arise and who is therefore in the best position to weigh the potential benefits and harms
accompanying the admission of particular evidence"); Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of
Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV. 413, 458 (1989) (noting that "the
Advisory Committee intended to give trial courts the maneuverability to craft its rulings to do
individual justice"). See generally Jon R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the Admission of Evidence
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097 (1984).
229. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 n.5 (D. Md. 2007); MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 3, § 11.446; Robins, supra note 27, at 315; see also James
E. Carbine & Lynn McLain, Proposed Model Rules Governing the Admissibility of Computer-
Generated Evidence, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 8 (1999) (noting that
"[1lawyers and judges have easily adapted the rules of evidence and procedure" to computerized
records).
230. FED. R. EvD. 102 ("These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the
law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.").
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evaluation. 231 Further, there is no guarantee that textual amendments will nec-
essarily create the desired national uniformity.232
However, the flexibility of the rules to adapt and address the challenges of
ESI does not necessarily mean that amendments are not needed. Even with this
flexibility, some of the changes wrought by technology have no common law
analog, making it difficult for judges to resolve them. Additionally, the
current rules are premised on the concept of written, physical evidence, a con-
cept that technological changes have significantly altered in the new millen-
nium.23 4 These changes necessitate the reconsideration of the traditional rules
of evidence.235
Accomplishing these changes through the amendment process would
provide a stronger mechanism for providing uniformity than relying upon
appellate courts. On appeal, courts are constrained by the highly deferential
standard of review for trial court evidentiary rulings. 236 Even when this highly
237deferential standard is overcome, reversal may not be appropriate. Thus,
action by appellate courts would not provide the predictability and uniformity
necessary to address the challenges of ESI. 238
231. RICE, supra note 9, at 492-94.
232. See generally DANIEL J. CAPRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE LAW DIVERGENCE FROM
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (2000), reprinted in 197 F.R.D. 531 (2000), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsflookup/CaseLawD.pdf/$file/CaseLawD.pdf. Accordingly, some
commentators propose amending pretrial procedures instead of the rules of evidence to address the
challenges of ESI. See generally Dean A. Morande, A Class of Their Own: Model Procedural
Rules and Evidentiary Evaluation of Computer-Generated "Animations," 61 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1069 (2007),
233. See RICE, supra note 9, at 492; see also Bums et al., supra note 52, at 227 ("Litigants
will continue to face challenges simply from the amount of new data being created.").
234. See GEORGE L. PAUL, FOUNDATIONS OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE xxv (2008); see also
Finkelstein & Storch, supra note 123, at 17 (noting that ESI presents "types of evidence not even
contemplated when the rules were written").
235. PAUL, supra note 234, at xxv.
236. See, e.g., United States v. Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Appellants
who challenge evidentiary rulings of the district court are like rich men who wish to enter the
Kingdom; their prospects compare with those of camels who wish to pass through the eye of a
needle." (quoting United States v. Glecier, 923 F.2d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 1990))); Am. Express
Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Vee Vinhnee (In re Vee Vinhnee), 336 B.R. 437, 443 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2005) (noting that "a trial court that is finicky about settled authentication requirements will be
sustained unless we have the firm and definite conviction that there was a clear error of judgment
in rejecting the proffered authentication"). For a more extensive discussion of the deference
appellate courts give to the evidentiary rulings of trial courts, see generally David P. Leonard,
Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1155 (1992).
237. See, e.g., ACTONet, Ltd. v. Allou Health & Beauty Care, 219 F.3d 836, 848 (8th Cir.
2000) (noting that even if a trial court erred by admitting Internet evidence, reversal was not
appropriate because the affected party could not demonstrate prejudice).
238. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Text, Texts, or Ad Hoc Determinations: Interpretation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 71 IND. L.J. 551, 553 (1996) (noting some of the difficulties in relying
upon appellate courts to provide definitive answers to lower courts on evidentiary issues).
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The Federal Judicial Conference, Congress, and the Supreme Court have
demonstrated their willingness in the past to address the procedural problems
posed by electronic communications.239 Perhaps the most obvious example of
this concept is the passage of the e-discovery amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in 2006. 4°
In the evidence context, Congress recently adopted a new rule of evi-
dence, Rule 502, in part to address the problems of inadvertent waiver caused
by the production of electronically stored information. 241 This amendment
illustrates not only a willingness to address the problems presented by ESI
generally, but also an initial attempt to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to
accommodate the proliferation of ESI in litigation that resulted from the e-
discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.24 2 Further, at
the state level, thirty-eight states have adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
which recognize the unique challenges of electronic evidence and have provi-
sions specifically designed to address them.
24 3
Similarly, the rules of authentication, hearsay, and the best evidence rule
244
should be amended to address the unique issues presented by ESI. Under the
current system, a tremendous amount of uncertainty has arisen. 245 As a result,
parties spend a significant amount of time and resources preparing for the
toughest admissibility standard, with no guarantee of success.24 By amending
the rules to address these issues, litigants and judges can avoid potentially
239. For a complete description of the amendment process, see generally 6 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 88, § 1102.02. To summarize, within limits and subject to specific proce-
dures, Congress delegated power to the Supreme Court to "prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure and rules of evidence for cases" in federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006). How-
ever, Congress retains the authority to review or reject proposed rules. See id. § 2074. Further,
Congress can also enact rules of evidence directly, for example, as it did when it adopted Federal
Rule of Evidence 412. See The Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
540, 92 Stat. 2046 (codified as amended as FED. R. EvID. 412). The Judicial Conference of the
United States, by statute, has the responsibility of initially reviewing and proposing new federal
rules as well as amendments. See 28 U.S.C. § 331; id. § 2073. See generally 6 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 88, § 1102.03, for a complete description of the procedure for judicial amend-
ments to the federal rules.
240. See supra Part I.B.
241. See S. REP. No. 110-264, at 1-3 (2008).
242. See id.
243. See UNIF. R. EvID. 101 cmt. (1999); Legal Info. Inst., Uniform Rules of Evidence
Locator, http://www.law. comell.edu/uniform/evidence.html (last visited May 9, 2010) (listing the
states that have adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence).
244. Notably, these are not the sole areas in which amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence may be necessary. Similar to the e-discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a complete modernization may be appropriate. See generally Paul, supra note 9.
245. See, e.g., RICE, supra note 9, at 492-94; Bums et al., supra note 52, at 227-29.
246. See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 574 (D. Md. 2007); Bums
et al., supra note 52, at 221; Dale Conder, Jr., The Admissibility of Electronically Stored
Information, FOR THE DEF., Sept. 2008, at 22, 29 ("Failure to prepare for the most demanding
standard may cost you the benefit of the electronic evidence you diligently collected during the
pretrial phase of your case.").
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wasteful expenditures of time and money, as well as benefit from greater pre-
dictability and uniformity in the admission of ESI at trial.247
Uncertainty also imposes costs on parties before trial. For example, a
large business that may potentially be subject to suit in multiple jurisdictions
will have to maintain its records in a manner to ensure admissibility according
to the toughest evidentiary standard.248 Clearly addressing this issue in the
rules would allow businesses to avoid unnecessary expenses and efficiently
249structure their policies to ensure admissibility in subsequent litigation.
The uncertainty created by differing admissibility standards is also signifi-
cant because it affects summary judgment and other pretrial dispositive mo-
tions. 2 50 As a practical matter, these motions allow parties to minimize litiga-
tion costs by resolving cases quickly, and most cases are resolved in this
manner. 25 1 When ruling on these motions, however, a court can only consider
evidence that would be admissible at trial.252 Thus, a court's approach to elec-
tronic evidence has significant effects both before and during trial.
B. Authentication
To address the varying standards used by courts, several changes should
be made to the authentication rules.253 By addressing the differences among
247. See Mengler, supra note 228, at 457 (noting that "the Federal Rules of Evidence are
intended to provide some guidance to trial courts and litigants"); Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating
Hearsay, 87 HARv. L. REV. 957, 974 (1974) (noting the "definite need for clear, uniform, and
predictable rules of evidence to serve as the basis for rapid judgments at trial and as a guide for
trial preparation").
248. See RICE, supra note 9, at xvii-xxi.
249. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 228, at 1004 (noting how clear guidance on evidentiary
issues allows litigants to avoid unnecessary expense and delay).
250. See, e.g., Boehning & Toal, supra note 176 (noting that the evidentiary issues relating
to ESI are important because "[c]learing the evidentiary hurdles ... could mean the difference
between a successful motion and the uncertainty of a trial").
251. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation
Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichds Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1048-56 (2003) (discussing the increased use of summary
judgment in civil litigation). In 2009, only 1.2% of civil cases in federal district court went to trial.
JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 165 tbl.C-4 (2010), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/judbus2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf.
252. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 987-88 (7th Cir.
2000); Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 636 n.20 (8th Cir. 2000); Gleklen v.
Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., Inc., 199 F.3d 1365, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Macuba v.
Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322-24 (11th Cir. 1999); Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem'l Hosp., 192
F.3d 378, 387 n.13 (3d Cir. 1999); Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 1997); Bombard
v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996); Thomas v. Int'l Bus. Machs.,
48 F.3d 478, 485 (10th Cir. 1995); Sakaria v. Trans World Airlines, 8 F.3d 164, 171 (4th Cir.
1993); Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 974 F.2d 646, 650 n.3 (5th Cit. 1992);
Finn v. Consol. Rail Corp., 782 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1986); Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal
Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324, 1335 n.9 (9th Cir. 1980).
253. See Galves, supra note 227, at 272 (stating that an explicit amendment to the authenti-
cation rules is needed to provide guidance to judges as to the proper foundation for computer-
generated evidence). Commentators are divided as to the probability, under the status quo, that the
authentication rules will be amended to address ESI. Compare RICE, supra note 9, at 359 n.40
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courts on how ESI is authenticated, the Rules can begin to resolve the prob-
lems associated with ESI, such as the greater potential for fraud and manipu-
lation, in a more efficient and effective manner.
254
Initially, Rule 901(b)(1) should be amended to clarify the issues that arise
when authenticating ESI through witness testimony.255 Currently, courts differ
over how much weight to give to concerns over the potential for technologi-
cally savvy individuals to alter electronic information. 256 Accordingly, as pre-
viously mentioned, some courts require testimony authenticating the content of
257
electronic information. With Web sites, for example, because of concerns
about potential manipulation by hackers, these courts require testimony that
the site owner or operator placed the information onto the site.258
One way to address these concerns for witness testimony is for authentica-
tion rules to distinguish between printouts of electronically stored information
and situations where an electronic version is available. Because printouts of
ESI do not contain all of the information available in an electronic version,
such as metadata, that courts could use to verify authenticity, there should be a
heightened authentication requirement when a party offers a printout into evi-
dence without making an electronic copy available.25 9 In these circumstances,
testimony about the substance of the printout would be appropriate to prevent
the admissibility of potentially compromised evidence. 260 Otherwise, if a party
possesses the information in electronic form, such as when a party possesses a
hard drive containing the information, that party should be able to authenticate
the information using normal chain of custody testimony. 261 This distinction
(noting that amendments appear unlikely), with Paul, supra note 9 (noting current trends at the
state and federal level to address the evidentiary challenges of electronic evidence).
254. See RICE, supra note 9, at 494.
255. See supra Part 11.A.3; see also Galves, supra note 227, at 270-71 (arguing that changes
should be made to the rules governing the witness testimony needed to authenticate computer-
generated evidence).
256. See supra note 107 and accompanying text; see also Gregory P. Joseph, Internet
Evidence, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 2001, at A14 (noting that some judges are inherently skeptical of
anything from the Internet).
257. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
259. Cf 8B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 2218 (noting the "substantial reasons for access"
to electronic versions of computerized information in order for an opposing party to test the
reliability of the evidence).
260. See Rudolph J. Peritz, Computer Data and Reliability: A Call for Authentication of
Business Records Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 956, 990-93 (1986)
(discussing the need for a more comprehensive authentication procedure for computer-generated
data to address potential system insecurity and manipulation).
261. See ARKFELD, supra note 1, § 8.11(C); IMWINKELRIED, supra note 135, at 74-82; see
also Erin E. Kenneally, Confluence of Digital Evidence and the Law: On the Forensic Soundness
of Live-Remote Digital Evidence Collection, 2005 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 5, 25-26, http://www.
lawtechjoumal.com/articles/2005/05_051201_Kenneally.php (discussing the chain of custody
procedures used by digital forensic practitioners to authenticate ESI). In the context of Web sites,
a party could also compare the electronic version to a printout to verify the printout's authenticity.
See generally ARKFELD, supra note 1, § 3.10(B)(3) (discussing how Web sites are stored elec-
tronically). Presumably, when a hard drive exists, a party can then obtain it, or an electronic copy
of it, during discovery.
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best serves the primary purpose of the authentication requirement: preventing
fraud and mistake.
262
Accordingly, Rule 901(b)(l) should be amended to read as follows: "In
the case of electronically stored information, if the evidence has previously
been produced or made available in electronic form, testimony about the proc-
ess by which it was obtained will suffice. Otherwise, such testimony should
refer to its substantive content.
'263
In practice, the effect of this amendment depends on the form of ESI that
a party is offering into evidence. For Web sites, if the site was currently online
and accessible by the opposing party, it would qualify as being "available"
pursuant to the proposed amendment. In this situation, a witness would testify
that he or she typed in the Web site's address, viewed the site, and that the
printout accurately reflects what he or she viewed.264 This testimony would be
similar to the approach used to authenticate photographs. 265 Indeed, one court
has already made this analogy. 2 66 Although the potential for fraud exists, the
opposing party can explore this possibility through cross-examination. 267 Oth-
erwise, if this information was not available electronically, the amended Rule
would require a more elaborate showing, akin to the standard adopted by some
courts requiring proof that the company actually placed the information on the
268
site.
For e-mails, providing an electronic version of an e-mail during discovery
or before trial would qualify it as having "previously been produced." In that
case, basic chain of custody testimony would suffice to authenticate it.269 More
specifically, a party could lay a foundation by printing the e-mail's electronic
routing information, introducing the routing records for each server that han-
dled the message, and establishing that the e-mail's purported author had pri-
mary or exclusive access to the computer where the message originated. 70
If a party had not previously produced an electronic version, testimony
about the e-mail's content would be necessary to comply with Rule
901(b)(1). 2 1' For example, a witness could testify that only the purported au-
262. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
263. This provision would presumably adopt a definition of electronically stored information
that is consistent with that used by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text.
264. See Gregory P. Joseph, Internet and E-mail Evidence, 13 PRAc. LITIG. 45, 46 (2002).
265. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
266. See ACTONet, Ltd. v. Allou Health & Beauty Care, 219 F.3d 836, 848 (8th Cir. 2000)
("HTML codes are similar enough to photographs to apply the criteria for admission of photo-
graphs to the admission of HTML codes.").
267. See Joseph, supra note 264, at 46.
268. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2000); see also supra
note 105-07 and accompanying text.
269. See, e.g., IMWINKELRIED, supra note 135, at 80-81 (summarizing the traditional chain
of custody method of authentication).
270. See id. at 81-82.
271. Cf RICE, supra note 9, at 347 ("The 'cold,' or unanticipated, nature of many e-mail
contacts, the susceptibility of manipulation of e-mail headers, and the possibility of hackers ma-
nipulating Web postings will often create the need for additional methods of proof."). It is worth
50 JURIMETRICS
Time for an Upgrade
272
thor of the e-mail knew the information it contained. Testimony that the
alleged author took action consistent with the content of the message would be
another method of authentication in this situation.
273
Rule 901(b) should also be amended to explicitly incorporate the use of
technology as a method of authentication. 274 Including a separate provision
would provide a clear mechanism for parties to use when technological meth-
ods of authenticating ESI are available. 2 75 It could also address the current
differences in the application of the "distinctive characteristics" illustration in
276Rule 901(b)(4). An amendment, however, must remain broad enough to
adapt with changes in technology. 277 Thus, as technological mechanisms for
falsifying information develop and proliferate, the rule should be flexible
enough to allow parties to use new measures to counter those mechanisms as
well.278
One technology that could be used pursuant to this new illustration is
electronic signatures. 279 The legitimacy of this technology is already recog-
nized at the state and federal levels. 28 0 In 2000, Congress passed the Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN) to address the
problems associated with contracting in cyberspace. 281 E-SIGN defined "elec-
tronic signature" as "an electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or
logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by
a person with the intent to sign the record. 82 The Uniform Electronic Trans-
actions Act, adopted by forty-seven states, contains an identical definition.
283
reiterating that this analysis pertains solely to authentication pursuant to Rule 901(b)(1). Other
authentication methods would not be affected by this proposed amendment.
272. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 135, at 75; RIEDY ET AL., supra note 12, at 188-89.
273. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 135, at 75.
274. See Paul, supra note 9 (noting that "courts must become aware of the demise of the old
authenticity paradigm, simultaneously acknowledging incipient solutions for authentication which
are possibly superior to the old regime").
275. See Galves, supra note 227, at 270-72 (proposing the addition of a separate illustration
to FED. R. EvtD. 901(b) to provide guidance for courts faced with computer-generated evidence).
For a general discussion of several potential technological authentication methods, see RICE, supra
note 9, at 386-91 and IMWINKELRIED, supra note 135, at 75-82.
276. See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
277. See RICE, supra note 9, at 335 ("While the advent of digital technology has expanded
the ways in which documents can be corrupted or forged, it has also expanded the ways in which
they can be authenticated.").
278. See id. But see Colin Miller, Even Better than the Real Thing: How Courts Have Been
Anything But Liberal in Finding Genuine Questions Raised as to the Authenticity of Originals
Under Rule 1003, 68 MD. L. REv. 160, 207-09 (2008) (stating that advances in the technology
used to detect manipulation lags behind advances in the technology used to commit fraud).
279. See Paul, supra note 9 (discussing the use of digital signatures for authentication pur-
poses).
280. See id.
281. Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-
7031 (2006)).
282. 15 U.S.C. § 7006(5) (2006).
283. See UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2(8) (1999); A Few Facts About the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-
ueta.asp (last visited May 9, 2010) (listing the states that have adopted UETA). Other uniform
laws have similar definitions. See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 102(6) (1999).
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Both laws have provisions recognizing the potential legal effect and enforce-
ability of an electronic signature.
284
Another new technology that courts have indicated may be useful for
authentication purposes is the use of "hash marks" or "hash values." 285 "Hash"
is a "mathematical algorithm that represents a unique value for a given set of
data, similar to a digital fingerprint., 286 A party can apply this algorithm to an
individual file, a section of a disk, or an entire hard drive, creating a unique
"hash value" that will change if the affected data is subsequently altered.28  If
even a single word is changed, the algorithm creates a new hash value, making
any alterations clearly identifiable.288 For this reason, one court indicated that
the use of hash marks could make ESI self-authenticating. 289 Indeed, some
courts have adopted local protocols suggesting that parties use this technology
during discovery to identify each unique file and to maintain its integrity
290throughout litigation.
Providing for the use of authenticating technologies, such as electronic
signatures and hash marks, is beneficial for several reasons. First, as previ-
ously outlined, many of these forms of authentication are already recognized
as legitimate by other bodies of law. Allowing for the use of such technolo-
284. See 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a)(l) (2006) (stating that "a signature, contract, or other record
relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely be-
cause it is in electronic form"); UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 7(a) ("A record or signature
may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form."); see also
UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 13 ("In a proceeding, evidence of a record or signature may
not be excluded solely because it is in electronic form.").
285. E.g., Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 546 (D. Md. 2007); Williams v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 655-56 (D. Kan. 2005); ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note
11, at 24 (noting that hash values can be "used to guarantee the authenticity of an original data
set"); Ralph C. Losey, Hash: The New Bates Stamp, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 20 (2007) (noting
that "[h]ash is ... an excellent tool to guarantee the authenticity of ESI"); Paul, supra note 9.
286. SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY, supra note 12, at 25. For background on hash marks
and their uses, see generally Losey, supra note 285.
287. See ARKFELD, supra note 1, § 5.5(B).
288. See id.; see also Losey, supra note 285, at 13 ("Even if the files have a different name,
if their contents are exactly the same, they will have the same hash value. But if you simply
change a single comma in a thousand page text, that document will have a completely different
hash number than the original.").
289. Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 655 ("When an electronic file is sent with a hash mark, others
can read it, but the file cannot be altered without a change also occurring in the hash mark. The
producing party can be certain that the file was not altered by running the creator's hash mark
algorithm to verify that the original hash mark is generated. This method allows a large amount of
data to be self-authenticating with a rather small hash mark, efficiently assuring that the original
image has not been manipulated." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). Another court noted that
hash values would be sufficiently distinctive characteristics to permit authentication under Rule
901(b)(4). Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 547.
290. See, e.g., U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Md., Suggested Protocol for Discovery of Electronic
Information, at 20-21, http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/news/news/ESIProtocol.pdf (last visited May
9, 2010). This protocol "has not been adopted by the court but may be of assistance to counsel."
Id. pmbl.
291. See supra notes 280-90 and accompanying text; see also Paul, supra note 9.
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gies as an authentication tool would promote consistency between these areas
292 9
of the law. 2 The technology is also widely available, often at a low price.2 3
Further, recognizing the potential of technological methods of authentica-
tion would promote efficiency by creating an evidentiary presumption of au-
thenticity.29 Although the potential for fraud remains, "[u]sers must be re-
quired to accept responsibility for a more heightened level of security .... If
the device was misused, users should have to convince the jury of that fact.
' 295
A presumption, therefore, satisfies a party's burden of production and allows a
296jury to take any potential problems into consideration. Thus, applying this
presumption would achieve the proper balance between efficiency, predict-
ability, and promoting the goals of the authentication requirement.
A technology-specific amendment would also address the differing stan-
dards regarding the authentication of e-mails. 2 97 Instead of relying upon testi-
mony from the sender or the recipient, any e-mail or other electronic commu-
nication that contained a digital signature or a technological mechanism for
establishing its authenticity would satisfy the authentication requirement.
Although these changes do not address the potential for another individual
to use someone's e-mail account, a party opposing the admissibility of such
evidence always has the ability to dispute an e-mail's authenticity. 298 This
rebuttable presumption "may be the most reasonable, and perhaps the only
successful, method of accomplishing identification of authorship. '299 How-
ever, in the absence of an authenticating technology the other amendments to
Rule 901(b) would provide guidance about the substance of an authenticating
witness's testimony.
Further, any amendments should encourage judicial notice of appropriate
technological facts for authentication purposes. 300 The applicable rules are
292. See Miller, supra note 278, at 181-82 (noting the importance of construing federal rules
consistently).
293. See, e.g., Losey, supra note 285, at 16 (stating that the software used to perform a hash
analysis of files is "widely available, easy to use, and many are free").
294. See RICE, supra note 9, at 388-89 ("In light of the compelling nature of the logical
inference of authorized use that would arise from the presence of an electronic signature on an
instrument, perhaps a formal evidentiary presumption (which does not currently exist) will even-
tually be recognized, shifting the burden of persuasion to the party claiming that the mark is not
authentic.").
295. Id.
296. See Joseph, supra note 264, at 47; see also United States v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 215, 220
(5th Cir. 2009) ("The ultimate responsibility for determining whether evidence is what its propo-
nent says it is rests with the jury.").
297. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
298. See RICE, supra note 9, at 349-50.
299. Id. at 350; see also Int'l Casings Group, Inc. v. Premium Standard Farms, Inc., 358 F.
Supp. 2d 863, 873 n.13 (W.D. Mo. 2005) ("[Tihe fact that the e-mail header with the name of the
sender can be electronically 'forged,' should not render it an insufficient signature as a matter of
law.").
300. See RICE, supra note 9, at 483-84; Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534,
553 (D. Md. 2007) ("Judicial notice could be a helpful way to establish certain well known char-
acteristics of computers, how the intemet works, scientific principles underlying calculations
performed within computer programs, and many similar facts that could facilitate authenticating
electronic evidence.").
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sufficiently flexible to allow a court to take judicial notice of the reliability of
science and technology and would not require any changes. 3 0 Accordingly,
courts could use judicial notice for the purpose of establishing the reliability of
underlying technologies.3 °2
This approach would not, however, eliminate other evidentiary hurdles,
such as logical relevance, authentication, the best evidence rule, or hearsay,
and a party could always introduce evidence of manipulation or fraud.30 3 Al-
though a court could take notice of the underlying technology, a party would
still have to establish the reliability of the particular application of that tech-
nology, establish that it was used properly, and authenticate any printouts or
other results produced. 304 This approach can be incorporated into any amend-
ments to Rule 901(b), which courts could use for guidance when asked to take
judicial notice of facts relating to ESI for other purposes as well.
Practically, an amendment addressing these issues could take the form of
a new illustration in Rule 901(b).30 5 This new illustration could be worded as
follows:
Electronically Stored Information. The content of electronically stored infor-
mation, in addition to any other method of authentication, by evidence,
through testimony or otherwise, of the presence of specific technological
measures. The accuracy of a specific technological measure is a fact of which
a court may take judicial notice, provided such notice complies with all ap-
plicable rules.
306
For an example of how this amendment could apply in practice, consider
the case of United States v. Whitaker, discussed earlier.30 7 In Whitaker, the
defendant raised concerns over potential manipulation when his co-conspirator
assisted police in retrieving information from a computer. 308 Applying the
proposed amendment, the police could have implemented a technology such as
hash values before the evidence was retrieved. Had this been done, any ma-
301. See RICE, supra note 9, at 483; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 593 n.l 1 (1993) ("Of course, well-established propositions are less likely to be challenged
than those that are novel, and they are more handily defended. Indeed, theories that are so firmly
established as to have attained the status of scientific law, such as the laws of thermodynamics,
properly are subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.")
302. See RICE, supra note 9, at 483-84; see also 2 Dix ET AL., supra note 2, § 294, at 324-25
n.l I ("The principles of electronic data processing are a proper subject of judicial notice and
should not require proof.").
303. RICE, supra note 9, at 484; see also supra note 82 and accompanying text.
304. See RICE, supra note 9, at 485.
305. See Galves, supra note 227, at 270-72 (arguing for the addition of a new illustration in
Rule 901 (b) to address the challenges of computer-generated evidence).
306. This provision is worded to mimic the style used by the illustration addressing the
authentication of telephone conversations. See FED. R. Evto. 901(b)(6). Note that under this
provision, a court could take judicial notice of a specific technology's accuracy, but it would still
require the proponent of ESI to demonstrate that it was properly applied to the evidence at issue.
307. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
308. See United States v. Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595, 602 (7th Cir. 1997).
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nipulation clearly would have been evident.309 The court could have taken
judicial notice of how such technology operates.
The proposed amendment would lead to similar results with e-mails. For
example, an e-mail could be authenticated through testimony about encryption
technology used to send the e-mail.310 Foundational testimony about the use of
a digital signature would also suffice for authentication purposes. 31' Again, a
court could take judicial notice of how these technologies operate-the key
foundation necessary to authenticate the evidence would be proof that such
technologies were in place and operational when the e-mail was originally
sent. Thus, combining this amendment with amendments to other illustrations
in Rule 901 would begin to provide the necessary clarity to allow a party to
predictably and reliably authenticate ESI, while still ensuring that the purposes
of the authentication requirement are not eviscerated.
C. Hearsay
As previously outlined, one of the most significant issues that arises when
courts apply the hearsay rules to ESI is the application of the business records
exception in Rule 803(6).312 Courts generally agree that printouts of computer-
ized records qualify under this exception.313 This outcome is consistent with
the text of the exception, which explicitly contemplates its application to elec-
tronically stored business records by stating that it applies to records "in any
form.
, 3 14
Fine-tuning the business records exception is important, however, because
businesses are shifting toward maintaining most, if not all, of their records
electronically. 315 E-mail also plays an essential role in the modern business
model.316 As one recent study found, a company with 100,000 employees
generated twenty-two million new e-mail messages each week.317 This volume
of e-mails grows annually.
318
309. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
310. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 135, at 75-78.
311. See id. at 78-79.
312. See supra Part l.B.3. Some commentators argue in favor of broader changes to the
hearsay rules with respect to ESI. See, e.g., RIEDY ET AL., supra note 12, at 206 (arguing that even
records that are entirely computer-generated should be subject to the hearsay rules).
313. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
314. FED. R. EviD. 803(6); see also id. advisory committee's note ("The form which the
'record' may assume under this rule is described broadly .... It includes, but is by no means
limited to, electronic computer storage.").
315. See, e.g., 2 Dix ET AL., supra note 2, § 294, at 323 ("With the explosive development of
electronic data processing, most business records are now processed by computers."); Carbine &
McLain, supra note 229, at 8 ("Even most small businesses keep their records on computers and
use computers for their bookkeeping.").
316. See, e.g., RIEDY ET AL., supra note 12, at 197 (noting that "business today runs on e-
mail"); Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 27, at 338 ("E-mail is fast becoming the primary means
of communication between businesses and individuals."); Robins, supra note 27, at 222-23.
317. RIEDY ET AL., supra note 12, at 5.
318. Id.
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In light of these changes, the business records exception is increasingly
important. 319 If the exception did not apply, it would be difficult, if not impos-
sible, for a business to locate and present as witnesses all of the individuals
who may have supplied computerized information. 320 Further, the modem
business model requires a daily reliance on ESI and electronic communica-
tions.32' Accordingly, businesses are highly motivated, if only for self-serving
reasons, to ensure the accuracy and reliability of their electronic data.322 The
current approach taken by many courts, however, fails to recognize these
changing business practices.323
The first issue that amendments should address is the requirement that
records be "kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity."
324
Many courts narrowly construe this requirement in the context of ESI to re-
quire a business to have a policy mandating the preservation of ESI, particu-
larly e-mails. 325 Rule 803(6) should be amended to reject this heightened bur-
den.
Specifically, a provision should be added to Rule 803(6) that reads as
follows: "In the case of electronically stored information, including electronic
communications, it must be the regular practice of that business entity to retain
the information, either intentionally or unintentionally, in any form."
United States v. Ferber provides an example of the potential practical
effect of this proposed amendment. 326 In Ferber, a mail and wire fraud case,
the disputed evidence was an e-mail from the defendant's co-worker that de-
scribed a telephone conversation that the coworker had with the defendant.
327
At trial, the government sought to introduce a printout of this e-mail.328 The
government properly authenticated the e-mail and provided foundation testi-
mony that it was the coworker's routine practice to send it as part of the com-
pany's business. 329 The court, however, excluded this evidence, concluding
that there was no showing that the company required e-mails to be main-
tained.33 ° Without such a showing, the court concluded that "virtually any
document found in the files of a business which pertained in any way to the
functioning of that business would be admitted willy-nilly as a business re-
cord."
33 1
319. See BINDER, supra note 186, § 16:17; Finkelstein & Storch, supra note 123, at 15.
320. See BINDER, supra note 186, § 16:17.
321. See id.
322. See id.; 5 WIGMORE, supra note 157, § 1522, at 442.
323. See BINDER, supra note 186, § 16:17.
324. FED. R. EviD. 803(6).
325. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
326. United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90 (D. Mass. 1997).
327. Id. at 98.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 98-99.
331. Id. at 99.
50 JURIMETRICS
Timefor an Upgrade
The proposed amendment would dictate a different result in Ferber. If the
government could demonstrate that the coworker had a duty to send the e-mail
and regularly did so as part of the company's business, the fact that the com-
pany lacked a policy requiring that the e-mails be maintained would not pre-
vent admissibility. In other words, as long as the company retained the e-mail,
even unintentionally, the "kept" requirement would be satisfied.332
However, if a party could demonstrate suspicious circumstances, a court,
in its discretion, could still exercise its authority to exclude the record as lack-
ing indications of trustworthiness. 333 For example, if a company had policies in
place requiring the deletion of e-mails on a regular basis, yet a particularly
damning e-mail mysteriously survived, a court could decide to exclude it.
Overall, by maintaining the traditional foundational requirements, but adjust-
ing them for the ESI context, this change would not erode the purposes of the
business records exception, nor permit the wholesale introduction of all of a
business's files "willy-nilly."
334
Another issue deserving attention through an amendment to the Federal
Rules of Evidence is how the business records exception interacts with the
self-authentication requirement. One of the benefits of the business records
exception is that, when combined with Rule 902, it allows businesses to sub-
mit self-authenticating records to a court without the cost, delay, and hassle of
sending the appropriate personnel to testify. 335 Otherwise, practical problems
and substantial costs may prevent such records from being admissible alto-
336gether. Ensuring a streamlined process for the admission of ESI pursuant to
the business records exception allows companies to avoid these problems and
realize significant cost savings.
332. As outlined earlier, ESI is often retained unintentionally. See supra notes 28-29 and
accompanying text.
333. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (providing that business records are excluded from the hear-
say rule if the foundational requirements are met, "unless the source of information or the method
or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness"); BINDER, supra note 186, §
16:17 (noting that Rule 803(6) "give[s] the trial judge discretion to exclude hearsay that would
otherwise qualify for exception from the hearsay rule as an entry in a business record, if the judge
finds that the source of information, or the method or circumstances of preparation, indicate lack
of trustworthiness").
334. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. at 99.
335. E.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(6) advisory committee's note (stating that, when combined with
the self-authentication provision of Rule 902(11 ), "the foundation requirements of Rule 803(6) can
be satisfied ... without the expense and inconvenience of producing time-consuming foundation
witnesses"); BINDER, supra note 186, § 16:17; 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 88, §
900.07(1)(d)(iii) (noting that this procedure results in "saving time and money for the court and
[the] parties"); see also United Asset Coverage, Inc. v. Avaya Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1008,
1052 (N.D. I1. 2006) ("One of the most useful ... accomplishments of the Judicial Conference's
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence during this Court's tenure as its Chairman was in
adding a new Rule 902(11) .... That new provision was intended to obviate the need for live
witnesses to parade to the stand to support the admission into evidence of business records.");
DirecTV, Inc. v. Murray, 307 F. Supp. 2d 764, 772 n.3 (D.S.C. 2004) ("Rule 902(11) was de-
signed to work in tandem with an amendment to Rule 803(6) to allow proponents of business
records to qualify them for admittance with an affidavit or similar written statement rather than the
live testimony of a qualified witness.").
336. See BINDER, supra note 186, § 16:17.
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Accordingly, Rule 902(11) should be amended to complement the pro-
posed changes to Rule 803(6). Specifically, in light of the changes to Rule
803(6), Rule 902(11) should be amended to add a new subsection (d) that
reads as follows: "In the case of electronically stored information, these re-
quirements must be accompanied by evidence reasonably demonstrating the
integrity of the medium in which the evidence was stored."
Imposing this additional requirement for self-authentication purposes
addresses the concerns of many courts and commentators over the potential for
manipulation or alteration of ESI.337 This amendment would address these
concerns by requiring evidence showing that the computer, database, or other
electronic storage mechanism had reasonable security procedures in place.
338
More specifically, this amendment would have several real-world effects.
Traditionally, when a party introduces a business record and seeks to take
advantage of the self-authentication provision in Rule 902(11), a written decla-
ration from the records custodian establishing the foundational requirements
will accompany the record.339 The rule also requires a party to give notice of
its intent to use this provision, along with a copy of the record and declaration,
to the opposing party.340 Thus, requiring foundational evidence about the secu-
rity measures in place provides the opposing party with the opportunity to
investigate if it suspects fraud or alteration once it receives this notice.
Next, consider In re Vee Vinhnee, where the disputed evidence consisted
of computerized credit card records.34 1 To comply with Rule 902(11), the
credit card company provided a declaration from an employee identifying the
type of equipment used by the company, the software used to generate the
records, and a conclusory statement that the industry deemed it reliable. 342 The
trial court excluded this evidence as improperly authenticated for purposes of
the business records exception.
343
The appellate court affirmed this decision. 344 The court emphasized that a
party seeking to admit electronic business records must demonstrate the cir-
cumstances in which the record was maintained.345 According to the court,
such circumstances included "custody, access, and procedures for assuring that
the records in the files are not tampered with. 346 In this case, the declaration
provided by the credit card company contained no information about the com-
pany's computer policy, system control procedures, or how the company con-
337. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
338. Cf Stanley A. Kurzban, Authentication of Computer-Generated Evidence in the United
States Federal Courts, 35 IDEA 437, 452-53 (1995) (discussing the need for business records to
be assessed in combination with the entire process by which they are maintained and stored).
339. See FED. R. EVtD. 902(11).
340. Id.
341. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Vee Vinhnee (In re Vee Vinhnee), 336 B.R.
437, 441-42 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).
342. Id. at 447 & n. 14.
343. Id. at 440.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 444.
346. Id. at 444-45.
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trolled access, logged changes, or used procedures to ensure the integrity of
records.
347
This is the type of information contemplated by the proposed amendment
to Rule 902(11). The proposed change achieves a balance between ensuring
some threshold showing of reliability and avoiding the imposition of an oner-
ous burden on parties attempting to introduce business records. It contemplates
only a minimal showing of the mechanisms in place by the party offering the
evidence, similar to the Rule 104(b) standard used by a judge when determin-
ing the admissibility of evidence. 348 In other words, a party does not need to
conclusively establish that its system is impregnable, but rather must demon-
strate what it has done to minimize the risk of fraud or alteration.
3 49
However, the proposed amendments would not require as heavy a burden
as that outlined by the Vee Vinhnee court. That court indicated that a party
must demonstrate that "the document being proffered is the same as the docu-
ment that was originally created. 35 ° Under the proposed revisions, a business
would only need to provide information about its policies relating to access,
recording changes in records, or similar information. Moreover, a party could
still introduce evidence indicating the alteration of electronic records if it sus-
pects fraud or hacking. 351 The pretrial notice required by Rule 902(11) would
also provide a party with the opportunity to explore potential weaknesses be-
fore trial. 2 In combination, these amendments would address the most preva-
lent issues involving the application of the hearsay rules to ESI evidence and
provide predictable mechanisms for courts to use when determining its admis-
sibility.
D. Best Evidence Rule
In modem society, technological changes have rendered the best evidence
rule meaningless. 353 As a result, the Federal Rules of Evidence that implement
the best evidence rule should be amended to address a theoretical gap that
currently exists in how courts apply it to ESI.354
347. Id. at 448-49.
348. See 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 88, § 900.06(l)(c)(i) ("Most courts agree that
Rule 104(b), rather than Rule 104(a), governs the authentication determination."). The Rule 104(b)
standard is a preliminary determination by the judge that there is evidence sufficient to support a
jury finding that the proffered evidence is relevant. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b); 5 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 88, § 900.06(l)(c)(i).
349. See Peritz, supra note 260, at 933.
350. In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. at 444.
351. See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 2006) (noting that a
party opposing the admissibility of e-mails is free to raise issues of potential alteration with the
jury).
352. See FED. R. EvID. 902(11).
353. See RICE, supra note 9, at 305.
354. See id. (stating that the best evidence rule has become meaningless in the Internet age,
with the only solution being to revise the doctrine to reflect these technological changes); Galves,
supra note 227, at 272-73 (arguing that amendments to the best evidence rules are needed to
address the challenges of computer-generated evidence).
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For example, multiple parties can view a Web site at the same time.
355
While the images that each visitor to the site sees are typically identical, tech-
nically, there is a distinct image displayed on each visitor's computer
screen. 356 Thus, no single original exists, and the total number of originals
corresponds to the total number of visitors to a site.357 Each computer, there-
fore, ends up being a potential source of an "original," but "mutual observation
of each . . . party's hard drive is not possible" to prevent fraud and altera-
tion.358 Whether illustrated by Web sites or other forms of ESI, this result
creates a disconnect between the theory of the best evidence rule and its appli-
cation to ESI.
359
To address this problem, the definition of "original" under Rule 1001
should be amended to require, when dealing with ESI, proof that the form
produced is the final, unaltered form of the information or document. Specifi-
cally, in the definition of original, following the provision for data stored in a
computer, a sentence should be added that states: "This provision does not
include a printout or other output readable by sight unless its proponent pre-
sents evidence sufficient to support a finding that it has not been subsequently
altered or modified."
Practically, this standard may be difficult to satisfy, as it may be difficult
to find the "final" version of a specific e-mail, document, or other piece of
electronically stored information. 360 Technological tools, such as hash values,
are one potential method of making this showing. 361 This change would also
remove enhanced or altered digital images, recordings, or similar forms of ESI
from the definition of "original."
However, this would not necessarily mean that the evidence now classi-
fied as a duplicate is not admissible. Rather, this issue can be addressed by
amending the definition of "duplicate" to include any ESI that would be ex-
cluded from the new definition of "original," and by amending the rule gov-
erning the admissibility of duplicates. 362 Initially, an additional sentence
should be added to Rule 1001(4) which states: "This definition includes a
printout or other output readable by sight that its proponent cannot present
evidence sufficient to support a finding that it has not been subsequently al-
tered or modified."
355. See RICE, supra note 9, at 303.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. See id.
360. See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 547 (D. Md. 2007) ("Be-
cause it is so common for multiple versions of electronic documents to exist, it sometimes is
difficult to establish that the version that is offered into evidence is the 'final,' or legally operative
version."); RICE, supra note 9, at 303.
361. See supra notes 285-88 and accompanying text.
362. See Paula Noyes Singer, Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence as
Applied to Computer-Generated Evidence, 7 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 157, 187-88
(1979) (proposing a similar approach for addressing how the best evidence rule applies to
computer-generated evidence).
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The rule governing the admissibility of duplicates, Rule 1003, should also
be amended to state that a duplicate of ESI may be admissible if its proponent
produced it to the opposing party in its "original form."363 This amendment
could read as follows: "In the case of data or output readable by sight, a dupli-
cate is admissible if the data or output was produced to all opposing parties in
its electronic or original form, unless it would be unfair under the circum-
stances."
This change to Rule 1003 would clarify how courts would administer the
new definition of "original" and "duplicate," as well as promote consistency
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 364 Judges could also apply the pro-
vision that excludes evidence when admitting it would be "unfair under the
circumstances" 365 to those circumstances where an opposing party previously
had the opportunity to use discovery mechanisms to obtain an electronic copy
of evidence, yet refrained from doing SO.366 Further, the new provision would
dovetail with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b), which generally requires
a party to produce ESI in the form in which it is normally maintained.367
As previously outlined, one of the purposes of the best evidence rule is to
promote greater access to the more valuable and complete original version of
evidence. 368 The proposed amendment would further this goal by providing
access to the electronic version of proffered evidence, which provides valuable
363. See In re Gulph Woods Corp., 82 B.R. 373, 377-78 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting that
"where a written record, prepared prior to the computer record, contains a more detailed and
complete description of the transaction than that contained in the computer record, the proponent
of the evidence should be required to produce the more detailed record, or account for its nonpro-
duction").
364. Cf Miller, supra note 278, at 181-84 (arguing that Rule 1003 should be applied consis-
tently with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
365. FED. R. EviD. 1003.
366. For example, this provision could be applied if the party had the opportunity to request
the evidence in electronic form as per FED. R. Civ. P. 34, yet declined to do so. In criminal cases,
there are no rules regulating the form in which ESI is produced. E.g., Burns et al., supra note 52,
at 228 (noting that "ESI may be relevant in criminal cases, but there are no rules providing guid-
ance on document production in such instances"); see also United States v. O'Keefe, 537 F. Supp.
2d 14, 18-19 (D.D.C. 2008) ("In criminal cases, there is unfortunately no rule to which the courts
can look for guidance in determining whether the production of documents by the government has
been in a form or format that is appropriate."). At least one court applied FED. R. Civ. P. 34 in a
criminal case by analogy. See O'Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 19 ("The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in their present form are the product of nearly 70 years of use and have been consistently
amended... to meet perceived deficiencies. It is foolish to disregard them merely because this is a
criminal case, particularly where ... it is far better to use these rules than to reinvent the wheel
when the production of documents in criminal and civil cases raises the same problems.")
367. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii).
368. See Cleary & Strong, supra note 198, at 840 (noting that "the best evidence rule is in
large part predicated upon the assumption that important differences in value exist between origi-
nal writings and copies of them"); see also supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
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information, such as metadata, that does not exist in a printed version. 369 To
complement this change, Rule 1003(2) should be amended to include the un-
availability of an electronic version as a "circumstance" for the court to con-
sider.370 These changes would provide additional guidance for courts when
confronting the best evidence rule issues raised by ESI.
In combination, these amendments would have several practical effects on
how the best evidence rule is applied to ESI. Under the current regime, be-
cause any printout qualifies as an original, the best evidence rule serves a
minimal purpose.371 This led one court to conclude that a party satisfied the
best evidence rule, even though the alteration of an electronic media file re-
sulted in the loss of metadata.
372
With the proposed changes, however, the Rules would now classify most
ESI as a duplicate. As a result, a court would generally admit it as an original
unless an opposing party raises a "genuine question" about its authenticity, or
it would be "unfair" under the circumstances to admit it as a duplicate.373 Re-
turning to the altered audio file example, applying the proposed rule changes
would allow a court to conclude that the loss of metadata made the admission
of the file into evidence "unfair under the circumstances" and to exclude it as
violating the best evidence rule. Despite this conclusion, pursuant to the pro-
posed change to Rule 1003, if a party produced an electronic copy of the file
before trial, the duplicate would nonetheless be admissible.
Overall, these amendments would begin to address the issues currently
created by the potential for numerous originals of ESI to exist. They would
also address how the purpose of the best evidence rule is undermined when a
party modifies ESI, yet courts still consider it an original. Under the proposed
revisions, in order for such evidence to satisfy the best evidence rule, a party
would have to show that a duplicate is admissible pursuant to Rules 1003 and
1004. Clarifying this distinction would also address the uncertainty over when
secondary evidence is admissible.
369. See 8B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 2218 (noting the importance of a party receiv-
ing ESI in its electronic form instead of a printed copy); see also Armstrong v. Executive Office of
the President, 810 F. Supp. 335, 341 (D.D.C. 1993) ("A paper copy of the electronic material does
not contain all of the information included in the electronic version. For example, a note distrib-
uted over these [sic] computer system includes information that is not reproduced on the paper
copy regarding who has received the information and when the information was received, neither
of which is reproduced on the paper copy."); see also supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
370. Specifically, FED. R. EVID. 1003(2) could read as follows: "A duplicate is admissible to
the same extent as an original unless ... (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the
duplicate in lieu of the original In the case of data or output readable by sight, these circum-
stances shall include the availability of such evidence in electronic form." (proposed amendment
italicized).
371. See RiCE, supra note 9, at 305.
372. See United States v. Sattar, No. 02 CR 395(JGK), 2003 WL 22510435, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2003).
373. FED. R. EviD. 1003.
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As one commentator noted, "Fitting the rules of evidence into the Internet
age is a bit like pouring old wine into new bottles. Some will fit neatly, while
others will require a degree of dexterity and ingenuity, and there will be an
occasional miss and mess." 374 The evidentiary issues posed by electronically
stored information may be difficult to resolve effectively, but that does not
mean that inaction is preferable. While not comprehensive, this article pro-
poses specific rule amendments in an attempt to facilitate the discussion of
modernizing evidentiary rules to confront the unique issues posed by techno-
logical advancements. Until such changes are implemented, judges and attor-
neys will be forced to confront the challenges of ESI on a case-by-case basis,
and to live with the uncertainty, inefficiencies, and varying standards that
result.
374. RICE, supra note 9, at 492.
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